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Public Authority and the Provision of Public Goods in Conflict-Affected 
and Transitioning Regions 
Kasper Hoffmann and Tom Kirk1 
  
Abstract 
This paper uses a systematic literature review to suggest that three emerging critical 
approaches to the production of public authority are identifiable within the contemporary 
literature on conflict-affected and transitioning regions. We term these approaches the ‘public 
authority from below perspective’, the ‘hybrid political orders lens’, and ‘political 
settlements analysis’. Although hailing from diverse disciplinary backgrounds, it will be 
shown that these approaches share important traits. First, they suggest that to better 
understand the nature of public authority in transitioning and conflict-affected regions it is 
necessary to uncover how public authority actually works rather than departing from a theory 
of the state. This includes accounting for how power is legitimated and practiced within each 
context, and how claims to public authority are connected to the provision of public goods 
such as security and justice. Second, they view competition, conflict and contestation as 
enduring features of public authority in such contexts, and call for empirical examinations of 
these processes to inform understandings of social change. Last, the approaches argue that 
public authority is an emergent property, always in production and never definitively formed. 
This implies that neat dichotomies such as formal/informal, private/public, and 
modern/traditional should be applied with caution by analysts seeking to understand public 
authority from the perspective of people living with insecurity and change. Despite these 
similarities, the conclusion suggests the approaches should be unpacked and their normative 
assumptions challenged. Each can then be drawn upon to arrive at empirical understandings 
of how public authority is produced and exercised, and how it relates to the provision of 
public goods in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. 
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Introduction 
The Fragile States Discourse and its Critics 
The post-Cold War era has been marked by a debate over the causes of, and remedies for, 
conflict-affected and transitioning regions of the world.2  It is argued that fragile or failing 
states threaten both the international community and their own populations, who suffer from 
persistent political instability and underdevelopment (Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Clunan and 
Trinkunas 2010; Goldstone et al 2010). Indeed the ‘fragile states discourse’ has been 
mainstreamed in security, development and policymaking circles. 
Examining the rise of this discourse, Di John (2008) identifies two broad strands within the 
state fragility literature.3 The first suggests that persistent insecurity and underdevelopment is 
partly attributable to the failure of states to fulfill their core functions. This perspective 
frames fragile states and their institutions in terms of a supposed deviancy from liberal or 
rational-legal Weberian models of public authority and statehood. Fragile states, therefore, 
are portrayed as lacking central monopolies on the legitimate use of violence, functioning 
legal systems and rational bureaucracies able and willing to provide public goods to their 
populations.4 The perspective also builds on Hobbes’ idea of a social contract between states 
and citizens, with the former providing goods and services in return for political legitimacy 
from the latter.5 For proponents of this strand it is the nature of the social contract which 
determines the legitimacy of public authority. Indeed corruption, predation, exclusion, 
violence and even war are seen to be symptoms of the weakening of the social contract, not 
the cause. Thus, the literature often attributes growing distance between citizens and states to 
afflictions such as ‘resource curses’ or ‘rentier states’.6 To strengthen the social contract and 
foster accountable authorities, adherents of this view prescribe democratic structures, 
economic liberalisation and administrative principles derived from Western models of ‘good 
governance’ (Grindle 2007).7  
                                                          
2
 Our use of the term ‘transitioning regions’ refers to the state of flux and rapid change that is characteristic of 
conflict-affected and supposedly fragile states, and helps avoid assumptions about the direction or stability of 
regions before empirical analysis. It is not meant to suggest a way point on a teleological journey towards some 
ideal political order. 
3
 We are aware that this is a heterogeneous body of literature, which comprises several different arguments and 
positions. Indeed a full treatment is beyond the scope of this paper. Good critical reviews of this literature have 
been written by Hill (2005) who uses a post-colonial lens and Hameiri (2007) who uses a political economy 
lens.  
4
 For Weber rational-legal authority denotes a belief ‘in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those 
elevated to authority under such rule to issue commands’ (Weber 1978:217-220). 
5
 Putzel (1999:201) defines political legitimacy as the 'acceptance of the right to rule'. He explains that the ‘more 
legitimate a political regime, organization or individual actor, is in the eyes of a population the less its survival 
or continuance in power requires the use of coercion or the threat of coercion’. 
6
 The literature on ‘resource curses’ and ‘rentier states’, including the concepts’ detractors, is too vast for an 
adequate treatment here. The point is that both of these concepts describe afflictions commonly cited by 
proponents of the first strand of the fragile states discourse. For notable contributions see Collier and Hoeffler 
(1998, 2001, 2004), de Soysa (2002a, 2002b) and Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
7
 As Booth (2012:20) puts it: ‘good governance has meant giving priority to civil service reform, to improving 
public financial management or setting up anti-corruption watchdogs and public audit bodies. Or it has focused 
on making governments more accountable to citizens by means of multi-party elections, democratic 
decentralisation and other devices of citizen participation. In relation to the economy, it has meant an at least 
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Subscribing to this first strand, Zartman (1995) and Rotberg (2002) argue that political orders 
begin to fall apart when the state faces a crisis of legitimacy. For Rotberg (2002:85), this 
situation arises when states ‘no longer deliver positive political goods to their people’. Thus 
he suggests a hierarchy of positive political goods that stable states should provide: a) 
security; b) institutions to regulate and adjudicate conflicts; rule of law, secure property 
rights, contract enforcement; c) political participation; d) social service delivery, 
infrastructure, and the regulation of the economy. Similar attempts to delineate state functions 
in this manner have given rise to a cottage industry devoted to outlining indicators of fragility 
for use in large cross country comparisons (Stepputat and Engberg-Pedersen 2008). In turn, 
these indicators have made it possible for states to be profiled and roughly ranked along a 
spectrum from weak or fragile to failed or collapsed. Torres and Anderson (2004) have 
shown how this strand of the fragility literature has been endorsed by aid agencies and major 
donors, each selecting their favoured indicators to define fragility.8 For instance, the OECD’s 
(2010:15) working definition of state fragility associates state capacity with its ability to 
develop mutually constructive and reinforcing relations with society. Thus it explicitly links 
indicators based on service provision with an underlying concern with the social contract.  
The second strand of the fragile states discourse has its roots in much of the pre-2001 
literature on African states (Bayart 1993; Rhodes 1994; Reno 1998; Chabal and Daloz 1999). 
In contrast to the first strand, this literature recognises the full range of Weber’s ideal types of 
legitimacy - rational-legal, traditional, and charismatic - as sources of authority.9 Its authors, 
therefore, largely abandon attempts to measure fragility in favour of a concentration on how 
capital accumulation and political legitimacy are maintained in the neo-patrimonial and 
clientelist orders that they claim characterise conflict-affected and transitioning states. 
Accordingly, they focus on how supposedly fragile states emerge and how they ‘work’ in 
spite of their deviancy from liberal and rational-legal forms of statehood. Taking a longue 
durée view, they suggest that pre-colonial African political culture, colonial legacies, 
including indirect rule, authoritarianism, and the bifurcation of administrative models 
between urban and rural regions, have all affected the long run viability of the state.  
In a much cited example of this approach, Bayart (1993) uses the notion of the ‘politics of the 
belly’ to suggest that African leaders are compelled to strip the state’s resources to sustain 
their patronage networks and legitimise their rule. This compulsion stems from the 
continuation and adaptation of both pre-colonial and colonial-era institutions to post-colonial 
political contexts. Indeed these historical legacies are seen to structurally constrain African 
leaders into seeking political authority through the incorporation of ever-greater numbers of 
informal political and economic actors into the state’s patronage networks. Reno (1996, 
1998) builds on this idea by suggesting that while weak rulers use their patronage of informal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
temporary withdrawal of the state from productive sectors, limiting it to policy-making and regulatory functions. 
The emphasis has been on facilitating private investment by establishing a rule-governed, low-cost, predictable 
business environment.’ 
8
 See Stepputat and Hansen (2008) for further examples.  
9
 For Weber (1978:226–241, 215) traditional authority rests ‘on an established belief in the sanctity of 
immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them’ and charismatic authority 
rests ‘on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the 
normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him’. For rational-legal authority see note 3 
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economic networks and connections to international markets to bolster their authority, they 
corrupt, or in some cases altogether bypass, state institutions. In essence, the state is gradually 
criminalised in return for the authority needed by rulers to maintain their rule. In another 
variation on this theme, Chabal and Daloz (1999) suggest that state fragility is a purposeful 
strategy through which African leaders with few prospects of long terms in power maximise 
their returns while accommodating potential rivals to their positions. To achieve these aims 
state-based leaders turn to informal patron-client networks, be they based on ties of kinship, 
ethnicity, witchcraft, religion or shared business interests. Indeed, the authors argue that for 
African leaders ‘political legitimacy’ is derived ‘from a creatively imprecise interaction 
between what might be termed “ancestral” norms and the logic of the “modern” state’ 
(ibid:9). As a result, the state is deemed ‘no more than a decor, a pseudo-Western facade 
masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations’ (ibid:16). Furthermore it is 
suggested that while these social bonds deliver a modicum of political order, attempts to 
introduce liberal political or economic models to Africa only give leaders greater scope to 
penetrate state institutions with informal networks. Thus efforts in the post-Cold War period 
to transfer Western governance models to African contexts have failed to create a 
developmental state or secure long run political stability.  
The two identified strands of the fragile states discourse have been accompanied by important 
criticisms. The concentration on the social contract and state legitimacy in the first strand of 
the discourse is particularly susceptible to arguments that it overlooks the exogenous causes 
of state fragility. Among other factors, these may include a state’s position within the global 
economy, the role of external interventions, the effects of climate change, the global 
transmission of norms and the contemporary ease of transnational migration. This strand may 
also risk equating the lack of centralised authority with a Hobbesian state of nature. As Baker 
(1999: 136) puts it, ‘Western eyes find it hard to view the inversion or cessation of the 
institutional state as anything but a backward step into anarchy’. Accordingly, areas within 
supposedly fragile states, or sometimes these states in their entirety, are labeled as ‘frontiers’, 
‘black spots’, ‘borderlands’ or regions of ‘softened sovereignty’ (Das and Poole 2004; 
Stanislawski 2008; Clunan and Trinkunas 2010). Fearing the uncertainty that accompanies 
lawlessness, Western commentators often point to these regions as incubators of terrorism, 
illicit markets and destructive ideologies (Krasner and Pascual 2005; Gourevitch 2004; 
Williams 2006). This discourse may allow policymakers to paper over a thorough 
investigation of everyday life and politics in such regions or, more worryingly still, to 
legitimise coercive interventions. 
The second strand of the fragile states discourse arguably goes some way towards alleviating 
the reductionist tendencies of the first and encourages empirical investigations of governance 
processes in supposedly fragile states, including the ways in which leaders may be able to 
capitalise on globalisation. However, this strand’s authors still tend to argue that African 
states are characterised by endemic levels of clientelism, which turn state institutions into 
ciphers of particularistic interests and underpin chronic instability (Nugent 2010:35). Indeed 
for his part, Di John (2008:26-26) argues that both strands of the fragile states discourse 
assume that elites are preoccupied with the survival of their regime and personal 
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accumulation; ‘predatory as opposed to developmental aims’. Thus he contends much of the 
literature neglects to ask why clientelism and patrimonialism leads to fragility in some cases, 
while in others it may be integral to more positive transitions. This criticism extends to 
considerations of why both violent and non-violent challenges to state authority, and 
exclusionary or violent state practices, have led to development and stability in some 
instances and not in others. Similarly others argue that due to its lack of  attention  to 
contextually specific realities below the national level, the fragile states discourse is limited 
in its capacity to understand the roots of the challenges afflicting these states and to prescribe 
suitable remedies (Hamieri 2007: 123). Some critics even claim that the fragile states 
discourse’s homogenising brush portrays post-colonial populations as unequipped for modern 
statehood and consequently as the ‘deviant other’ to citizens of Western states (Hill 2005). 
For many, therefore, its line of reasoning is essentialist, ahistorical and teleological 
(Hagmann and Péclard 2010:541; Titeca and de Herdt 2011:215). 
For the purposes of this paper, we begin from suggestions that the theoretical and normative 
assumptions listed above limit the fragile states discourse’s ability to produce empirically 
grounded and context-dependent data on how public authority is legitimated and exercised, 
and how this affects the everyday lives of end-users (Nielsen 2007; Englebert and Tull 2008; 
Hagmann and Hoehne 2009; De Waal 2009).10 Therefore, in an effort to look beyond these 
approaches, this paper reviews recent literature on the production of public authority and 
public goods provision in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. Although we draw upon 
case studies that take in a variety of contexts, our concentration is largely on analytical 
perspectives and frameworks developed in African contexts – the main focus of the Justice 
and Security Research Programme (JSRP) for which this paper was written. Within this 
literature we identify three approaches; the ‘public authority from below perspective’, the 
‘hybrid political orders lens’, and ‘political settlements analysis’. Although categorised as 
such, it will be shown that the approaches contain both broad similarities and distinguishing 
variations.   
In many ways the approaches under review can be seen as reactions to the deficiencies of the 
fragile states discourse.  However, we also argue that they share many analytical overlaps 
with its two identified strands. We understand these overlaps to revolve around two concerns, 
namely, the production of legitimate authority and the provision of public goods. With regard 
to the latter, we specifically concentrate on the provision of security and justice not only 
because they are prioritised within the fragile states discourse, but also because these public 
goods consistently emerge in the reviewed approaches. Thus we show how the relationship 
between the production of public authority and provision of these public goods is presented 
within each approach and how they encourage alternative ways of understanding the 
legitimisation and exercise of public authority in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. 
The overall aim of the review is to aid future conceptualisations and empirical investigations 
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 Our use of the term ‘end-users’ denotes the person or people who are the supposed beneficiaries of public 
goods provision by those claiming or exercising public authority.  
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of public authority and public goods provision in conflict-affected and transitioning states.11 
Before moving on it is necessary to provide an account of the methodology deployed to 
identify the relevant literature. 
 
Methodology  
The methodology aimed to identify literature exploring the theoretical, methodological and 
empirical debates surrounding the production of public authority and public goods provision 
in fragile and conflict-affected spaces. The review comprised two phases: a systematic 
database search, and a bibliographical search. The searches aimed to locate literature 
satisfying two criteria (a) they should discuss how public authority is established and 
maintained; b) they should be concerned with the provision of public goods, preferably 
security and justice. As stated earlier, even before the literature review began the emphasis on 
security and justice was chosen for two reasons. Firstly it is the primary interest of the JSRP 
research consortium in support of which this review was undertaken. Secondly, for a number 
of critical and mainstream commentators security and justice are viewed as core public goods 
and are often described as prerequisites for development (OECD 2007; Baker and Scheye 
2007; Ball et al 2008).12  
The initial systematic database search contained three sets of searches.13 Utilising Boolean 
logic, the first set of searches combined the search terms ‘public authorit*’ with ‘justice’ 
AND/OR ‘security’, depending on whether the searches brought back too much irrelevant 
material. These searches were complemented at a later stage with a search combining ‘public 
authorit*’ and ‘conflict’.14 The second set of searches combined ‘patron’ AND ‘client’ AND 
‘justice’ OR ‘security’. The third set of searches included the following search terms: 
‘bifurcated state’ OR ‘mediated state’ OR ‘political marketplace’ OR ‘twilight institutions’ 
OR ‘hybrid political order’ OR ‘patrimonialism’ OR ‘neo*patrimonialism’ OR 
‘neopatrimonialism’ OR ‘everyday governance’ OR ‘real governance’ OR ‘stateness’. It was 
anticipated that the term ‘public authority’ has a very general meaning and the research team 
acknowledged that words within the term have long histories within the social sciences. 
Unsurprisingly, searches using this term yielded a vast array of irrelevant results despite 
narrowing with the inclusion of terms such as ‘justice’ or ‘security’.  
Additional search terms were identified during a planning session that drew upon the 
expertise of the authors, JSRP management and research assistants. It was recognised that 
this was a necessarily subjective process, limited to each participant’s understanding of the 
field and aim of the paper. Overall the searches using precise terms (i.e. twilight institutions, 
mediated state, hybrid) were more useful than the general searches on ‘public authority’. Of 
these precise search terms, those such as ‘twilight institutions’ and ‘hybrid’ that reflect bodies 
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 The aim and rationale of the paper were agreed upon at a meeting between Mareike Schomerus; Koen 
Vlassenroot; Danielle Stein, Craig Valters and Kasper Hoffmann on 8 January 2013 at LSE. 
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 We return to this theme later. 
13
 The authors would like to thank Danielle Stein and Craig Valters for their assistance in the initial search.  
14
 ’Boolean logic’ describes the operations used to combine search terms in many search engines. 
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of literature known to the research team beforehand were especially useful. While terms such 
as ‘patrimonialism’ also yielded useful results they have references in many other bodies of 
literature and approaches, which required a close scrutiny of the returned sources. The initial 
search yielded 161 titles. 
The second phase of the search was partly based on the authors’ knowledge of existing 
literature relating to discussions of public authority in the domains of security and justice in 
conflict-affected and transitioning regions, and partly on the bibliographies of the texts 
yielded by the systematic database search. In addition, the authors added texts considered to 
be theoretically relevant on a more general level to the discussion of public authority. 
Accordingly, the authors do not claim that this selection is representative. At this stage two 
more criteria were added to narrow down the reviewed sources from both phases: (a) sources 
should be related to conflict-affected or conflict-transitioning countries (b) they should be 
written after 1989, unless they had enduring theoretical value. These criteria acknowledged 
our interest in post-cold war conditions for producing public authority in conflict-affected 
regions.  
In the final stage the sources were analysed. Three broad approaches to public authority and 
its relationship to the provision of security and justice were identified: the ‘public authority 
from below perspective’, the ‘hybrid political orders lens’ and ‘political settlements 
analyses’. The categorisation of authors into the different approaches during the review was 
based on the differences in their core arguments and theoretical presuppositions concerning 
public authority, rather than on their geographical focus or methodology. Having said that, 
we realise that there are substantial overlaps. To begin to understand the convergences, 
divergences, utilities and limitations of the identified approaches, the next section broadly 
explores their treatment of the production of public authority.  
 
New approaches for understanding public authority 
The literature review revealed a number of different interpretations of how public authority is 
produced and exercised in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. However not all of the 
reviewed sources deploy the term ‘public authority’ and some of those that do, do not define 
it.15 Nevertheless, as will be shown throughout the paper, the reviewed texts share certain 
views on public authority:  
First, although describable as emerging literature streams, the three identified approaches 
largely understand public authority through a Weberian lens. Thus, they hold that any form of 
genuine authority (herrschaft) ‘implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an 
interest (based on ulterior motives or genuine acceptance) in obedience’ (Weber 1978:212). 
Indeed to differentiate between cases of purely involuntary subjugation such as slavery, 
which rests on coercion, and public authority, the latter is seen to require a ‘belief’ in the 
legitimacy of claims to authority (Weber 1966:328). As Weber argued: ‘What is important is 
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 See for instance Fjeldstad and Moore (2009); Juul (2006); Putzel and Di John (2012); Milliken and Krause 
(2002); Le Meur (2006); Meagher (2011);  
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the fact that in a given case the particular claim to legitimacy is to a significant degree and 
according to its type treated as ‘valid’; that this fact confirms the position of the persons 
claiming public authority and that it helps to determine the choice of the means of its 
exercise’ (Weber 1978:214). Second, despite their different epistemological roots, most of the 
reviewed literature acknowledges that public authority may be accorded to a variety of actors 
and institutions, both within and beyond the state.  Third, the emerging approaches suggest 
that actors and institutions legitimise their claims to public authority and the associated right 
to govern by, consciously and sub-consciously, drawing on the norms and values (e.g. 
customs, forms of rationality, morality or justice) considered valid among large sections of 
society. However, as will be shown, this does not imply that public authority is only rooted in 
traditional, customary or local norms. Indeed the approaches suggest that it may be imported 
or constructed from a range of material resources and symbolic repertoires. Last, they 
recognise that the provision of public goods, including security and justice, is often an 
important means with which to evoke socially accepted norms or exercise public authority. In 
the three approaches, therefore, public goods provision is a practice central to the production 
of public authority.16 Viewed together, this understanding suggests that public authority is 
built on a modicum of mutual recognition: on the one hand, those claiming public authority 
recognise the moral values and the norms of wider populations; while on the other, their 
claims are recognised as legitimate by those at whom they are directed.  
The spatial de-centering and the theoretical de-universalisation of public authority outlined 
above opens up a vast new terrain for the study of public authority in conflict-affected 
regions. To meet this challenge the reviewed authors delve into a diverse range of 
overlapping themes connected to the provision of security and justice. These include revenue 
generation, taxation and the regulation of economic activities (Fjeldstad and Moore 2009; 
Juul 2006; von Soest 2007; von Soest et al 2011), with the regulation of cross-border trade 
and the militarisation of the economy as favoured themes (Meagher 2009; Roitman 2004, 
2005; de Herdt and Titeca 2010; Garrett et al 2009; Raeymaekers 2009, 2010, 2010; 
Raeymaekers et al 2008; Vlassenroot et al 2008; Verweijen 2013; Walraet 2008). Another 
widely researched theme concerns local conflict resolution, peace-keeping, state-building and 
the provision of security and justice by actors and institutions considered non-state (Kyed 
2009a,b; Boege et al 2008, 2009a,b; Hagmann and Hoehne 2009; Menkhaus 2006; 
Autesserre 2007, 2009; Mallet 2010; Leonard and Samantar 2011). Yet another is the 
generation of peaceful political settlements, rents, developmental coalitions and the 
ascriptions of rights, including how local and national level elites turn coercive power into 
legitimate authority (de Waal 2009b; Di John and Putzel 2009; North et al 2009; 2012; Parks 
and Cole 2010; Laws 2011). A fourth theme focuses on competing claims to public authority 
as an entry point to understand the social processes through which institutions are made and 
un-made, and the consequences this has for access to resources and the recognition of 
property rights for different identities. By linking access, property (what you have) – in 
particular land – and public authority with issues of identity (who you are) this theme, also 
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 Putzel (1999:201) usefully reminds us that the public goods that secure legitimacy are rarely simply physical 
goods. They often include identities, sovereignty, the promotion of a nation’s international standing, a particular 
agenda or the maintenance of a challenging tradition.     
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touches upon issues of citizenship rights (Ferme 2004; Lentz 2006; Lund 2006a, 2006b, 
2008; Sikor and Lund 2009). A fifth analyses linkages between violence, the control of 
populations and territory, and public authority.  Accordingly, studies treat empirical 
phenomena such as policing, vigilantism, armed actors, and refugees as windows into local 
struggles (Buur and Jensen 2004; Buur 2006; Turner 2006; Pratten 2006; Fouchard 2012; 
Hansen and Stepputat 2006; Lund 2011).  
In the following sections we show how many of these themes are treated within each of our 
three identified approaches. The epistemological foundations of each approach, including 
their levels of analysis, primary actors and understandings of social change are then 
examined. This exploration is used to outline three considerations for future research into the 
production of public authority and its relationship to public goods provision, particularly 
security and justice, in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. 
 
The Public Authority from Below Perspective 
Introduction 
A number of authors are empirically studying the practice of public authority at the local 
level in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. In many cases, their work is filling in the 
gaps left by the generalising theories of the fragile states discourse. While these authors are 
not united by a common theme or theory, they do tend to converge on certain points. First, 
these authors generally carry out long-term fieldwork in one or more specific localities. 
Second, they tend to focus on the daily conflicts, competitions, contestations and negotiations 
over claims to public authority. Third, they understand public authority from a pluralistic and 
processual perspective, as opposed to a property fixed to the state. Thus they blur 
conventional distinctions between state/society, public/private and formal/informal. Lastly, 
many focus on daily governance practices and the provision of public goods by public 
authorities. As such they are interested in how public authority is exercised and 
institutionalised through everyday social encounters. Out of the three approaches identified 
this body of literature encompasses the greatest number of reviewed references. In the 
following section, therefore, we aim to draw out several of its main perspectives. 
 
Public authority and local political economies 
Beginning from the recognition that the state’s official apparatus has largely retracted from 
many conflict-affected regions, a growing number of authors focus on how public authority is 
practiced beyond the official state. In constrast to the earlier literature on non-state or 
informal governance, which tended to either frame these processes as ‘resistance’ to 
totalitarian states (MacGaffey 1987, 1991) or as local surviving cultural forms (Chabal and 
Daloz 1999), the contemporary literature generally views them as emerging, sometimes 
legitimate, forms of governance within political orders undergoing conflict-ridden, often 
violent, socio-economic transitions. Methodologically, many authors in this literature stream 
11 
 
agree with Lund that public authority should be studied through the ‘variety of concrete 
encounters between forms of public authority and the more or less mundane practices of end-
users’ (2006a:674).17 This leads investigations to adopt qualitative, often ethnographic, 
methods, with researchers situated in one or more fieldwork locations for long periods. 
Alongside the practices of claimants to public authority, the literature also encourages studies 
that uncover the lived experiences of end-users and excluded groups. Thus the agency to 
affect the production of public authority is sought among a variety of actors and locations.  
Theoretically, the authors lean toward a Weberian understanding of how public authority 
works.18 Indeed, for Lund (2006a:678), whose approach to public authority is widely 
deployed, authority means an ‘instance of power which seeks at least a minimum of 
voluntary compliance and thus is legitimated in some way.’19 In essence his definition of 
‘public’ is not far removed from Weber’s rational-legal ideal-type:  
The element of public should direct our attention toward two associated elements. On the one 
hand, public authority denotes impersonal administrative operations in a wide sense. On the 
other hand, it refers to public (as in ‘not secret’) confrontations, discussions and action in 
concert. Thus, we are dealing with institutions that, in the exercise of power, take on the 
mantle of public administrative authority (legitimated administrative operations) and in their 
attempts to govern articulate notions of ‘state’(ibid:678).  
Lund, therefore, sees claims to public authority as largely legitimated through references to 
the notion of the state.20 Indeed he suggests that a multitude of more or less transient 
institutions deploy the ‘language of stateness’ and ‘strut in borrowed plumes’ to legitimise 
their claims to public authority (ibid:677).21 This leads to the paradoxical notion that 
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 Blundo 2006; Blundo and Olivier de Sardan 2006; Olivier de Sardan 2009; Hagmann and Hoehne 2009; 
Verweijen 2013; Titica and de Herdt 2011; Migdal and Slichte 2005; Pratten 2006. 
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 E.g. Hagman and Péclard (2010:543); Titeca et al (2013:118); Vlassenroot and Rayemaekers (2008:13). 
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 Examples of authors taking their inspiration from Lund are: Schroven (2010:666-7); Grajales (2011:772-3); 
Meagher (2007:406, 2009:8); de Herdt and Titeca (2010:580); Fay (2008:2); Andersen (2011:12, 2012:114); 
Peters et al (2012:12); Mallet (2010:81); Rutherford 2011:209); Buur (2006:750-1); Logan (2009:102); 
Overbeek et al (2009:15); Hagmann and Péclard (2009:3); Titeca (2009:292); Vanderkerkhove (2011:762-3); 
Suykens (2010:159); Doornboos (2010:671); Prag (2010:15); Hagmann and Hoehne (2009:43); Titeca De and 
Herdt (2011:216); Büscher (2012:483). 
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 This idea is influenced  by Sally Falk Moore (1978), who argued that the ‘state’ in Africa usually represents 
itself in at least two different dimensions, i.e. as the embodiment of public authority (represented in a whole 
range of actors from customs agents to local administrators to school teachers) and in the form of an idea. This 
distinction applies both to the African state and to other polities and (groups of) actors that want to claim 
authority over certain governance domains in a context where neither holds an effective monopoly over the 
means of force. See also Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (1997, 1998, 2003), Raeymaekers (2010), and Titeca 
and de Herdt (2011). 
21
 The term ‘language of stateness’ is borrowed from Hansen and Stepputat (2001), who divide it into a practical 
and a symbolic language of stateness. The practical language of stateness contains three key themes: (1) the 
assertion of territorial sovereignty by the monopolisation of violence by permanent and visible military and 
police forces; (2) the gathering and control of knowledge of the population of this territory; and (3) the 
generation of resources and ensuring the reproduction and well-being of the population. The symbolic language 
of stateness also contains three themes: (1) the institutionalisation of law and legal discourse as the authoritative 
discursive presence and authority to authoritise; (2) the materialisation of the state in a series of permanent signs 
and rituals: buildings monuments, letterheads, uniforms, road signs, fences; and (3) the nationalisation of the 
territory and the institutions of the state through the inscription of a history and a shared community on 
landscapes and cultural practices.  
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statehood can be ‘effectively propelled by institutions which challenge the state but depend 
on the idea of it to do so’ (ibid:688-9). For many authors following this approach there is 
therefore a co-existence of multiple public authorities, linked to multiple spaces of authority 
within the public sphere, ‘each giving their own meaning to authority and political power’ 
(Raeymaekers et al 2008:9).22 These various ‘power poles’, as Bierschenk and Olivier de 
Sardan (1997:441) call them, interact and negotiate with each other over the daily governance 
of public services. As such, they are all involved in ‘doing the state’, processes which can 
occur in cooperation or competition (Migdal and Slichte 2005:14-15). Furthermore because 
public authority is influenced by the ebb and flow of conflicts, contestations, competitions, 
negotiations and collaborative arrangements it is never definitively formed. Instead a constant 
process of formation takes place (Lund 2006:686). For authors working with this perspective, 
institutions are continuously moving in and out of a capacity to exercise public authority. 
Indeed, for Lund 2006a, b, 2008), they are describable as ‘twilight institutions’. 
A recognition of the twilight nature of many institutions in conflict-affected and transitioning 
regions implies that conventional distinctions between public/private, state/society, and 
formal/informal must be seen as relative to concrete political processes rather than discrete 
entities. It is futile, therefore, to search for a scientific definition that will fix the boundary 
between these categories. Rather the concrete and everyday practices of a variety of actors 
must be investigated for the political distinctions they produce between citizen and stranger, 
owner and squatter, crime and justice, civilised and uncivilised, straight and queer, modern 
and traditional etc. In short, who is included and excluded from the public sphere and what 
this implies for their access to justice and security. For instance, some authors argue that 
distinctions between entities or cultures deemed modern or traditional were designed by 
colonial authorities as a means to bring the African peasantry into the market economy, while 
at the same time excluding them from the sphere of civic rights (Mamdani 1996, Ranger 
1983; Vail 1989; Lentz 1995). 
In order to overcome the constraints of these classical conceptual distinctions, which also 
tended to be deployed as units of analysis, authors have deployed alternative terms. These 
include ‘local political arena’ (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003), ‘complexes of 
power’ (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004), ‘arenas of negotiation’ (Hagman and Péclard 
2009) and ‘figuration’ (Titeca 2009). They are all designed to account for practices of 
governance, rationalities, forms of legitimacies and networks of power that transcend the 
political distinctions common to academic and policymaking circles. By the same token a 
number of terms have been deployed in order to capture the messy and contested reality of 
public authority. These include terms such as ‘twilight institutions’ (Lund 2006a, b; 2008), 
‘mediated state’ (Menkhaus 2006, 2008), ‘negotiated statehood’ (Hagmann and Péclard 
2009), ‘governance without government’ (Menkhaus 2006; Raeymaekers et al. 2008; 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2008) ‘real governance’ (Oliver de Sardan 2008; Blundo and 
Le Meur 2009) ‘diffuse authority’ (Suykens 2010) and ‘regulatory authority’ (Roitman 2005).  
                                                          
22
 See also Arnaut and Højbjerg (2008:11) and Titeca et al (2013: 117) 
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Authors adopting these terms argue that to understand public authority and service delivery 
attention must be given not only to state institutions but to the range of actors in the social 
field surrounding state institutions. This implies that researchers must leave behind implicit 
state-centric views of what constitutes governance. Instead, as Raeymaekers et al. (2008) 
argue, one could choose to see the production of public authority as ‘an emergent pattern or 
order of a social system, arising out of complex negotiations and exchanges between 
“intermediate” social actors, groups, forces, organisations, public and semi-public institutions 
in which state organisations are only one – and not necessarily the most significant – amongst 
many others seeking to steer or manage these relations’. For their part Titeca and de Herdt 
(2011:216) argue that state practices should be separated from the idea or the image of the 
state as a coherent organisation controlling a given territory and population. Similarly, Lund 
(2006:686) argues that in Africa it is difficult to ascribe exercised authority to the ‘state’ as a 
coherent institution; rather, public authority becomes the amalgamated result of the exercise 
of power by a variety of local institutions and the imposition(s) of external institutions, 
conjugated with the image of the state. 
As mentioned, the public authority from below perspective advocates for a focus on the 
everyday forms of interaction between various claimants to public authority and end-users. 
Although the ‘local’ or the ‘micro-level’ become the privileged empirical socio-spatial sites 
through which public authority is studied, authors are careful to point out that the local is 
linked to larger political, economic and social processes. Within the literature there are 
different ways of establishing these links and great variation in the scale and scope implied 
by the term ‘local’. One of the differences lies in the degree to which local politico-economic 
dynamics are seen as autonomous vis-à-vis larger processes. This reveals differences in the 
way authors weigh the importance of larger political, social and economic processes relative 
to local ones. Furthermore it implies that there are different methods of determining how 
specific forms of public authority emerge in different localities. For example, whereas 
authors such as Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2003:148) insist on the particularity of 
each ‘local arena’ in terms of the multiplicity and diversity of political institutions, cultures 
and logics - in short, the ‘modes of governance’ that exist even at village level in a country; 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers’ (2004: 15), on the other hand, highlight multi-leveled and 
authoritatively structured patterns of social production and exchange that take place in 
‘complexes of power’, defined as ‘patterns/networks of social control, protection, and profit 
emergent within the conflict environment’.  
Authors with a similar approach to Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan tend to look at how 
different national level policies or global discourses are strategically appropriated in specific 
localities.  For instance, in a study of state policies recognising the role of traditional leaders 
in Mozambique, Kyed (2009a, b, c) shows how these policies exacerbated existing tensions 
and sparked new contests over authority (2009c:114). Similarly, Moore (1987) shows how 
state legislation in Tanzania designed to abolish lineage chiefs and install elected leaders was 
sidestepped by the ability of elite families to use their personal networks to capture the new 
public authority positions. Thus leaders maintained local lineage-neighbourhood complexes 
and perpetuated the exclusiveness of the political order. Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot’s 
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(2004) approach, however, is less concerned with the side effects of discourses and specific 
national policies.  Instead they focus on how conflicts at the local level are embedded in the 
wider political economy of conflict, and how this affects conflict and security at the local 
level. While in this respect they build on the insights of the second strand of the fragile state 
literature, they ultimately go beyond it through examinations of how public authority works 
in practice in specific localities. Raeymaekers (2010), for instance, shows how during the 
Congolese war a protection arrangement negotiated between a locally embedded Congolese 
rebel group (RCD-ML) - enjoying the patronage of key figures in the Ugandan government - 
and local traders, led to a ‘pluralising’ moment. Through this reinterpretation of existing 
relations and regulatory practices a gradual transformation of the institutional framework and 
local governance practices occurred.  
Aiming to encompass both of these concerns, Hagmann and Péclard (2010) have recently 
offered a heuristic framework for the study of public authority from below in conflict-
affected and transitioning countries. They propose the term ‘negotiated statehood’ to 
describe, analyse and explore by whom (actors) and how (using which ‘material resources 
and which symbolic repertoires’) public authority is created, where these processes take place 
(‘negotiation arenas and tables’), and what are the main outcomes and issues at stake 
(‘objects of negotiation’). The authors advance four core propositions: (i) the (de-) 
construction of statehood is driven by dynamic and partly undetermined processes. These 
processes are fuelled by constantly evolving relations of control and consent, power and 
authority. (ii) Various actor groups compete, both successfully and unsuccessfully, over the 
institutionalisation of power relations into distinct forms of statehood. (iii) Negotiations over 
public authority are profoundly unequal because they engage highly heterogeneous groups 
with highly differentiated assets, entitlements, levels of legitimacy and styles of expression. 
(iv) Statehood, therefore, should be approached empirically and not judicially (ibid: 544-6). 
Indeed, with its focus on the contested nature of public authority (statehood), its call for a 
detailed empirical investigation of the material resources and symbolic repertoires deployed 
in the struggles over public authority, and its focus on multiple arenas within which 
legitimate authority is negotiated, Hagmann and Péclard’s heuristic framework can be seen as 
a summary of the research agenda of authors studying public authority from below. 
 
Public authority and a theory of sovereignty 
A stream within the literature studying public authority from below links public authority 
with a theory of sovereignty (Buur 2006; Hansen and Stepputat 2005, 2006; Buur and Jensen 
2004; Das and Poole 2004; Turner 2006; Hagmann and Korf 2012). Agreeing with Lund, 
these authors question the idea that public authority is a fixed property of the state. 
Furthermore they view the language of stateness as shared across society, with different 
groups deploying politico-legal discourses to legitimise the rightfulness of their claims to 
public authority. Yet, in contrast to Lund and others, these authors suggest an alternative 
substantial theory of political power; drawing on Agamben (1998, 2005) and Schmitt (1985), 
they define sovereignty as a principle of political power. They use this displacement of the 
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meaning of sovereignty from a property of the state to a principle explaining how power 
works, to redefine the nature of political power and, by extension, public authority.  
Schmitt famously claimed that the ‘sovereign is he who proclaims the state of exception’ 
(Schmitt 1985:5). For Schmitt (1985), the exception defines the rule of law precisely in the 
formal moment of decision by the sovereign. Sovereignty, therefore, emerges from decisions 
taken in spatially and temporally bounded spaces of exception. For his part, Agamben’s 
approach to the state of exception goes beyond Schmitt’s focus on decisionism and its 
implicit containerisation of the state of exception (Hagmann and Korf 2012:207). Rather he 
argues that the state of exception has become the dominant rationale in the exercise of public 
authority in modernity. Thus the state of exception is a pervasive topological figure within 
which the state of nature and the state of law (exception and rule) become indistinguishable; 
‘the state of nature and the state of exception are nothing but two sides of a single topological 
process in which, what was presupposed as external (the state of nature) now reappears in the 
inside (as state of exception)’ (Agamben 1998:37). Alluding to Hobbes (1996:1651), he 
argues that a state of nature precedes the formation of the state and rule by a sovereign. 
Indeed, for Hobbes, anarchy prevailed before humans gave up their freedom to a sovereign. 
However, in Agamben’s depiction of Western forms of sovereignty, elements in the body 
politic remain in a state of nature even after the formation of a modern state. These elements 
are depicted as violence without order, as violence that has not yet been tamed and that has 
not been brought into a contract with the sovereign.  
Agamben defines these elements as ‘bare life’; those which can justifiably be subjected to 
sovereign violence because they are considered uncivilised, unruly, or dangerous. In this 
perspective, sovereignty is defined as the ability to suspend the general principles of law and 
to kill those who are declared to be ‘bare life’ with legitimate impunity. One of the 
consequences of this understanding of sovereignty is that instead of tracing its localisation in 
particular institutions and incumbents, sovereignty becomes a principle, always secretly in 
motion in the exercise of public authority that defines the threshold of inclusion and 
exclusion in the political community (Agamben 1998:19). This threshold is by no means 
fixed, as different subjectivities – the refugee, the poor, the criminal, the unemployed, the 
homosexual, the mad, the pagan, the terrorist, etc – can all be deemed as ‘bare life’. This 
encourages an understanding of how certain politico-legal orders are formed by efforts to 
purify the body politic of dangerous subjectivities. 
Working with this theory of sovereignty Buur (2006) argues that the Amadlozi vigilante 
group, which was active in Port Elizabeth’s townships in South Africa in the early twenty-
first century, mimicked the formal state’s procedures and drew on its symbolic forms in its 
own ‘war on crime’.  They also drew on various other symbolic repertoires, including public 
discourses on crime and the ANC’s 1980s struggle to be the sole representative of the people, 
adapting them to their own moral and tactical concerns. However Buur (2006:750) shows that 
their actions were not aimed at undoing the state or establishing a different state; the aim was 
more state not less state. Thus he interprets their war on crime, which at times involved 
torture, as an example of the workings of the principle of sovereignty. As ‘bare life’, the 
group’s criminal suspects were framed as the constitutive outsiders of South African society; 
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they defined both the external limits of society and those belonging to it. In turn, by 
eliminating the figure of the criminal, the Amadlozi were demarcating the inside threshold of 
society. This allows Buur to show that in spite of their recourse to torture and their tendency 
to make arrests based on scant evidence, the Amadlozi’s war on crime was seen as a 
legitimate public good by wider society. 
 
 The provision of security and justice from below 
The authors writing from within the public authority from below perspective do not take for 
granted that the rule of law and a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence in a given 
territory constitute the minimal requirements for the production of public authority. As such, 
they do not claim that security and justice must be provided by the state. Instead, state service 
provision is recognised to co-exist with forms of justice and security provided by non-state 
actors (Kyed 2009a, b, c; Titeca 2009; Titeca and de Herdt 2010; Raeymaekers et al 2008; 
Raeymaekers 2010; Hagmann and Hoehne 2009). Although this view is consistent with legal 
pluralism, its proponents do not imply that there are a number of neatly distinguishable 
politico-legal orders existing side-by-side, with culturally distinct ways of practicing law and 
security.23 Rather they uncover the variety of ways of exercising public authority in contexts 
where the boundaries between governance institutions are always in flux. 
This is not to say that the literature on public authority from below does not see a connection 
between the provision of security and justice and public authority. On the contrary they 
cannot be dissociated as the former are constitutive practices of the latter. Raeymaekers et al 
(2008:14), for instance, argue that governance includes ‘the active processes of 
administrating and managing […] regulation mechanisms through the allocation of certain 
services, goods, and rights. These include processes of describing certain rights (for example 
to ‘public’ goods such as security, but also access to resources, or citizenship) as well as the 
active ascription of these rights and the conflicts these generate within a particular frame or 
context (as exemplified in conflict resolution mechanisms, political negotiation platforms or 
judicial bodies)’. 
The Weberian approach to authority, which predominates in the public authority from below 
literature, implies that there exists a relationship of reciprocity between various claimants to 
public authority and end-users. This reciprocity exists not just in abstract terms of a shared 
language of stateness, it exists also, if not primarily, in the daily governance of public 
matters. The question of reciprocity is obvious with respect to taxation and it is equally 
relevant for institutions that are not government but still exercise authority (Lund 2006b:696). 
In turn reciprocity is linked to legitimacy. For example, when traders operating in a border 
                                                          
23
 This recognition of the co-existence of different modes of rule-generation and order-making within a given 
political order is one of Moore’s (1978) major contributions to legal anthropology. This contribution has since 
predominated within the more recent literature on legal pluralism, which argues that state law is not the only 
possible source of rule-generation, and that it co-exists with other sources, such as international, folk, customary 
and religious systems of rules and norms (see, for example, Griffiths (1986); Merry (1988); Moore (1978); von 
Benda- Beckmann 1997; Galanter (1981); Santos (1987, 1995, 2006); Pospisil (1971); for a critique see 
Tamanaha (1993, 2000). 
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area in eastern Congo decided to accept the RCD-ML’s offer of protection in return for taxes, 
both groups stood to benefit: protection was traded for legitimacy and tax (Raeymaekers 
2010:572). The point here is that public authority is continually constructed in the 
imagination, expectation and everyday practices of end-users (Lund 2006b:696). 
In their study of public authority in Somali territories in east Africa, Hagmann and Hoehne 
(2009) argue that the provision of security and justice in these territories is taken care of by 
locally embedded non-state actors, particularly clan elders and sheikhs. According to the 
authors this proves that successful public authority can emerge ‘from below’ rather than 
being imposed ‘from above’, even with the absence of a centralised and legitimate monopoly 
of violence (Hagmann and Hoehne 2009:51). Based on their analysis they claim that a 
distinctly modern Somali statehood has emerged, which amalgamates customary, Islamic, 
and statutory norms and practices. The authors, therefore, suggest that local political orders 
must be explored in terms of institutionalised power relations between revived traditional 
authorities, ‘violent entrepreneurs’ such as warlords or militias, and state and party officials 
(Hagmann and Hoehne:52). As we will show, this theme is present throughout the three 
approaches to public authority identified in this paper.   
In sum, for those studying public authority from below, public authority involves a successful 
claim to be acting in the interest of the political community, primarily by way of the language 
of stateness. But public authority is not just a ‘language’; it is also exercised as the delivery of 
services. In many conflict-affected regions the state is only there in name, which allows its 
institutions to fall into disrepute. Other actors take on the mantle of public authority and 
provide public goods and services such as security and justice. Even so, the language of 
stateness, and perhaps even its modes of governance, may survive as a variety of twilight 
institutions continue to perform state discourses and practices;  thus public authority must be 
performed by acts of governance that are recognised as legitimate by the public. Indeed, as 
the authors within the sovereignty stream show, even torture, random arrests, public courts, 
killings and extortion can be seen as public goods in certain contexts if they are recognised as 
security measures taken in the interests of the state, understood as the guarantor of the 
‘public’ and the security of the community. Thus, to understand the production of public 
authority, analysts must carefully examine all processes, no matter how far from the state, 
unusual, or unpalatable they may at first appear. 
 
The Hybrid Political Orders Lens 
Introduction 
The hybrid political orders (HPOs) lens has become popular in state-building, peace and 
conflict studies (Clements et al 2007; Boege et al 2008; Boege et al 2009a and b; Kraushaar 
and Lambach 2009; Mac Ginty 2010; Baker 2010; Mallet 2010; Bellino 2012).24 Broadly put, 
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 This perspective is not to be confused with ‘civil war’ studies, which deploy the notion of ‘hybrid political 
regimes’, which are (governmental) regimes that exhibit both democratic and autocratic characteristics (Karl 
1995; Diamond 2002). Within this approach ‘hybrid political regimes’ refer to those regimes, which fall in 
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it attempts to counter the assumptions of the state fragility literature, including state-centric 
narratives of public authority and public goods provision, by emphasising the varied and 
contextually contingent nature of legitimate governance arrangements (Luckham and Kirk 
2012). Thus, drawing on frustrating experiences within recent state- and peace-building 
projects, many of its authors focus on the interactions of traditional, personal, kin-based or 
clientelistic logics with modern, imported, or rational actor logics, and ask how, and for 
whom, contests over public authority and the institutionalised distribution of public goods 
take place.  
Through its interest in organising ‘logics’ the HPOs lens is somewhat indebted to earlier 
work on informal governance practices such as clientelism, neo-patrimonialism and 
presidentialism. However it does not discount these practices as necessarily leading to 
‘disorder’, ‘corruption’ or the ‘criminalization of the state’.25 Instead it argues for a 
widespread recognition of the part these logics play in ordering society and establishing 
public authority through the provision of public goods in conflict-affected and transitioning 
regions. Indeed the emphasis placed on ‘logics’ reveals a culturalist approach to institutions 
which depicts them as providing guidelines of appropriate action,  backed up by sanctions 
(material and social) to limit non-compliance (March & Olsen 2005:4; Peters 2011:29-43). 
Furthermore, for some of the HPOs lens’ authors, many of the logics portrayed as destructive 
by the fragile states discourse may represent the only legitimate forms of ordering in conflict-
affected regions (Clements et al 2007:49).  
Within the HPOs lens, therefore, cultural logics are often viewed as positively functional 
rather than dysfunctional as the second strand of the fragile states discourse claimed.26 In this 
sense it could be argued that the HPOs lens is revisionist; so-called fragile states are in reality 
places where ‘diverse and competing claims to power and logics of order coexist, overlap and 
intertwine, namely the logic of the ‘formal’ state, of traditional ‘informal’ societal order, and 
of globalisation and its associated social fragmentation (which is present in ethnic, tribal, 
religious forms) (Boege et al 2009a:606).27 Consequently, where present, the state is argued 
to share authority and legitimacy with other actors, networks and institutions that transcend 
the formal/informal distinction (Lambach 2007; Wennmann 2011). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
between the categories of ‘autocratic’ and ‘full democracies’ measured by the terms of executive recruitment 
and the degree of political participation (Goldstone et al., 2010).  Countries with non-competitive executive 
recruitment and non-participatory decision making processes are classified as autocratic; those with fully open 
recruitment and political participation are classified as full democracies. These studies claim that there is a 
strong correlation between hybrid political regimes and the likelihood of political instability and conflict (Gates 
et al., 2006; Goldstone et al., 2010; Hegre et al., 2001; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006). 
25
 For an excellent critical review of culture-functionalist renditions of the African state see Blundo and Olivier 
de Sardan 2006:15-60. 
26
 Other authors describable by this term include (Rhodes 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Rotberg 2002) 
27
 This point was already being made by Mertonian functionalist studies in the early 1960s on the newly 
independent developing countries, where this so-called ‘revisionist’ trend found ideal ground for the testing of 
its hypothesis. Thus, in the words of one of its most widely quoted authors, corruption acts as an ‘emollient, 
softening conflict and reducing friction’ (McMullan 1961: 196).  
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 Multiple interacting logics of legitimacy 
From the point of view of the HPOs lens the legitimacy required to sustain public authority is 
provided by, and can emerge from, a variety of structures. Furthermore it can be cultivated by 
authorities through their interactions with one another and with the wider populations they 
govern. However, in contrast to the authority from below perspective, much of the literature 
portrays legitimacy as partly contingent upon cultural norms and values that have long been 
present in society. Renders’ (2007) exploration of how Somalia’s clan leaders and institutions 
provided Northwestern politicians with the social capital and tools to build a polity typifies 
this approach to the production of public authority.28 He suggests that Somalia’s civil war 
created the space for local clan elders to involve themselves in wider political issues, 
including the provision of security through the negotiation of peace deals for communities 
outside of their immediate kinship groups. Their activity was subsequently utilised by 
Somaliland’s second president, Mohamed Haji Ibrahim Egal, to legitimise his own claims to 
public authority. This included a drive for statehood through the establishment of various 
taxation schemes and a multi-party system that politically incorporated clan elders in 2001.  
Summarising this process, Renders (2007:442) argues that the shifting or setting of borders 
between the formal and informal sphere was the key instrument in political struggles between 
Somaliland’s competing groups. Thus he suggests that it would be a fallacy to view the 
instrumentalisation of entrenched norms from either the informal or formal spheres as an 
‘apolitical’ act; an argument that highlights one of the HPOs lens’ overlaps with the public 
authority from below literature. Moreover, he argues that informal institutions cannot be 
described a priori as ‘inherently good or bad for political legitimacy, governance or the 
degree of popular participation in it’ (Renders 2007:455). Indeed it was only due to the 
elders’ wartime and post-conflict ability to engage in activities outside their supposedly 
traditional roles that they became recognised as potentially inclusive sources of political 
authority and public goods provision. Accordingly Renders (2007) argues that policymakers 
must understand Somaliland’s hybrid political order as created through contextually 
contingent interactions between the conflict, clan logics and nationalist sentiments, and that it 
would be unwise to try to replicate these dynamics elsewhere.  
Seen from this angle, public authority is an emergent function of the wider political order. 
Indeed studies of HPOs seek to uncover the multiplicity of actors vying to create governance 
structures in fragile contexts. As shown by Renders (2007), they do not view the 
abandonment of a narrow focus on formal actors and institutions as a problem of conceptual 
precision, but as a necessary step towards understanding how HPOs function. Thus much of 
the literature focuses on ‘indigenous’, ‘customary’ or ‘traditional’ actors and institutional 
logics, portraying them and their rules as present before the introduction of other organising 
logics, be they the idea of the state or the designs of international interveners. However, as 
Kraushaar and Lambach (2009:14) argue, a hybrid lens does not privilege any particular rule, 
field, or organising logic in its explorations of public authority.29 Instead, as explored below, 
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 We use the term polity here because Somaliland has not been recognised by the international community as a 
state. 
29
 See Tamanaha 2008 for a critique of the classical view of legal pluralism. 
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it understands the production and exercise of public authority as taking place through a 
variety of practices, from the creation of safe markets to the actions of state-sanctioned 
militias and international interveners. 
 
Hybridity and the cultural origins of logics of legitimacy 
Before moving on, it is necessary to further unpick what the HPOs literature means by 
references to hybridity and pre-existing cultural logics, which we suggest are its 
distinguishing features.30 Offering some guidance on interpreting hybridity, Mac Ginty 
(2011:8) uses his notion of prior hybridisation to move away from the suggestion that two or 
more ordering logics are ‘grafted’ together to create a third, new logic. Thus those actors 
claiming public authority in HPOs should not be depicted as leisurely choosing between 
which isolated, homogenous or preserved, modern or traditional logics to combine. Rather 
hybridisation is a ‘dynamic and complex process’ in which a diversity of prior-hybridised 
entities coalesce, clash, and re-coalesce with other prior-hybridised entities (Mac Ginty 
2011:51). Indeed for many analysts hybridity is not about creating new governance 
institutions; it is about the adaptation of existing institutions to contextually specific 
collective action problems and the hoped for creation of ‘practical hybrids’ that provide 
public goods (Booth 2012:14). This process takes place within political contests between 
actors of differing power. Hybridisation, therefore, is often identified in regions that have 
recently been decolonised, have weathered conflicts describable as ‘new wars’, or have been 
subject to international state-building interventions (Kaldor 2006). These events arguably 
cause prior boundaries between the local, national and international to blur, and force people 
to seek ways of coping with the challenges raised by a new multiplicity of normative systems, 
claims to power and resources. Thus, for the HPOs literature, the production of public 
authority is often characterised by contests, negotiations and change, with different norms, 
values, actors and institutions swapping in and out of the driving seat. 
Touching upon many of these themes, Cummins (2013) examines the way in which local 
communities navigate the competing demands of co-existing state and community based 
governance institutions in East Timor. She reveals how the position of village chief, a state 
governance institution, is regularly filled by individuals locally considered capable of 
securing the community’s interests in negotiations with state authorities. Her research 
outlines how community leaders legitimise the election of their chosen village chief through 
an ‘embrace’ of both democratic and lisan [customary law] ‘ideals of legitimacy’ 
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 Mac Ginty (2011:70) suggests that a ‘review of the literature on hybridity needs to begin with a health 
warning: much of the literature on the subject is dense and inaccessible. It specialises in circular arguments, self-
indulgent prose, and a single-minded determination to avoid relevance to the ‘real world’. It also suffers from 
‘caveatitis’, or an inability to make any statement without smothering it in so many caveats that it becomes 
meaningless. Much work spends so much time conceptualising and ‘problematising’ (as though we don’t have 
enough problems) the term ‘hybrid’ that it does not actually move on to do anything useful with the term’. Thus 
we do not attempt this here and only report on its current usage by literature describable as reacting to the fragile 
states discourse. 
21 
 
(ibid:147).31 Thus, in support of their preferred candidates, communities adapt old rules 
stipulating that the village chief is a hereditary position and perform the necessary 
ceremonies to legitimise those elected in the eyes of the ancestors and the people, regardless 
of their bloodline. Emphasising that this process may rely on prior learned hybridisation, 
Cummins (ibid.) shows that the adaptation of local governance practices to contemporary 
challenges also occurred during the country’s occupation by Indonesia. Under occupation 
local leaders would decide amongst themselves who they wished to be village chief (at that 
time also the local representative of the Indonesian administration) and aggressively lobby 
state authorities to pick their preferred candidate. In the local vernacular, communities were 
‘wrapping up’ their customary practices in Indonesian governance institutions (ibid.:148). 
While this study highlights the importance of society’s norms for the legitimisation of public 
authorities, it also demonstrates that hybridity is not about replacing existing practices and 
value systems with a third new logic. Rather it is often a coping strategy that makes use of the 
material resources and symbolic repertoires open to those aiming to produce public authority 
in difficult conditions. Furthermore, Cummins’ (ibid.:156) conclusion that the relationship 
between formal and informal institutions in conflict-affected contexts is often ‘intimate and 
messy’, and that non-state authorities,  values and institutions can be important in contexts 
seemingly characterised by top down governance efforts, serves as a call for those examining 
public authority to unpick the dynamics of local political contests.32 
Through his careful development of a notion of hybridity that understands all cultural logics 
as products of prior and ongoing processes of ‘hybridisation’, Mac Ginty (2011) also aims to 
remind analysts of the limits of words such as ‘traditional’ or ‘customary’ that impart images 
of static cultures.33 Rather he suggests that long standing processes of cultural mixing shape 
and maintain the actors, practices and logics central to the production of public authority. As 
typified by Cummins’ research (2013), this view conceives of hybridity as the ‘gradualist’, 
‘everyday processes’ through which actors negotiate and renegotiate their own places and 
interests in political orders (Mac Ginty 2011:72). Furthermore, drawing upon the work of 
Bhabha (2009), Mac Ginty (2013) also argues that hybridity has been entrenched in most 
societies since before colonialism, that it accorded agency to colonial subjects, and that it 
allows those living with contemporary international interventions to resist the designs of 
outsiders. However, to avoid the criticism that hybridity is ubiquitous, Mac Ginty (2011:73) 
urges analysts to uncover the societies that are more or less describable as hybridised and to 
investigate which actors have the power to drive hybridisation.34  
In light of the above, Mac Ginty’s (2011:95) examination of post-2001 Afghanistan 
illustrates the difficulties faced by those trying to understand the role of hybridity in the 
production of public authority. For example, he suggests that in their struggle for survival 
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 Much of the HPOs literature adopts Knight’s (1992:41) definition of power: ‘To exercise power over someone 
or some group is to affect by some means the alternatives available to that person or group.’ 
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farmers may support the Kabul government at the same time as they derive income from the 
growth of poppies sold to the Taliban. While the latter action could be interpreted as a coping 
mechanism, it may also be a form of resistance to state interference in everyday life. 
Moreover it could be further hypothesised that the same farmers utilise local tribal justice 
mechanisms recently restored by an international NGO and rubber stamped by the Afghan 
state.  Although bringing disputes to this forum may give farmers a role in the hybridisation 
of the wider political order, it is difficult for analysts to discern to what extent and to what 
ends. For instance, while the farmers may welcome the legal rulings of the local court and its 
elders, they may not recognise the international NGO’s role in institutionalising the justice 
mechanism and may even reject the state’s claim to authority over its workings. Thus, 
although manifesting itself on the ground in everyday practices, to understand what, if 
anything, is being legitimised by hybrid processes is a difficult undertaking. Indeed 
historically sensitive and multi-sited research is needed, which, as Luckham and Kirk 
(2012:50) argue, includes understanding hybridisation through the vernacular of end-users. 
In a good example of the literature’s focus on the often ambiguous role of local politics and 
traditional authorities, Mallet (2010) describes the post conflict security and governance roles 
delegated to local chiefs by state officials and international organisations in Northern 
Mozambique. While he acknowledges the difficulty of labeling these emerging public 
authorities as either formal or informal, with chiefs acting as both representatives of their 
communities and agents of the state, he also suggests that traditional authorities are gradually 
formalised through an ‘iterative’ process of repeated negotiations with central authorities; a 
process that eventually creates a political community (Mallet 2010:79). Mallet also (2010:72) 
draws on Kyed (2009b) to argue that internationally sponsored community policing projects 
have adopted some of the symbolic and physical forms, including illegal activities and 
coercion, common to the cultures of wartime paramilitary groups. Thus, for Mallet, hybridity 
is evident in localised processes of ‘unmaking’ and ‘remaking’, as existing and introduced 
logics of public authority come into contact with one another. As suggested, this focus on the 
resilience of local social logics is characteristic of the hybrid lens. Yet, as with other authors, 
Mallet is careful to argue that the outcomes of these processes are always unknown before 
empirical research.35 This serves to remind those eager to use a hybrid lens to acknowledge 
the indeterminacy of processes of social change and not to romanticise supposedly traditional 
authorities or their ways of exercising public authority.   
Developing this theme, the HPOs authors have recently begun to design frameworks for 
interpreting the outcomes of interactions between different organising logics or institutions. 
Kraushaar and Lambach (2009:7) build upon Helmke and Levitsky’s typology (2004) to 
hypothesise four possible outcomes when the interests held by ‘effective’ and ‘ineffective’ 
formal and informal institutions converge or diverge; substitution, complementarity, 
competition and accommodation. Empirical cases of hybridity, however, are arguably 
characterised by nuanced accommodations and competitions that lie somewhere inbetween 
these categories. Indeed, although interested in HPOs undergoing liberal peace interventions, 
Mac Ginty’s (2011) alternative model attempts to capture these nuances and comes with 
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many caveats. Thus, suggesting that his model is a ‘simplification of reality’, he offers four 
variables to account for hybridity in such contexts (ibid:77-78). Each variable focuses on the 
compliance power of different actors and their ability to resist one another’s designs. 
However, he ultimately acknowledges that ‘Hybridisation is best conceived of as a constantly 
moving piece of variable geometry...[that]...operates on multiple levels, through multiple 
mediums, and impacts multiple (if not all) aspects of life’ (Mac Ginty’s 2011:77). This leads 
him to highlight the limitations of such frameworks, including their ability to account for the 
wider geo-political systems and structures within which HPOs reside. In sum, while these 
early attempts to formalise the HPOs lens remind investigators that the outcomes of 
hybridisation are far from ordained, they leave much room for improvement by future 
adopters of the lens. 
 
Justice and security provision – challenging liberal paradigms  
Many authors have adopted the HPOs lens to drive a counter-narrative to the fragile states 
discourse and the peace- and state-building policies that it has engendered. Using the term the 
‘liberal peace’, Mac Ginty (2010:391) defines these policies ‘as the dominant form of 
peacemaking and peace building favored by leading states and international organisations.’36 
Adding further depth, Eric Herring (2008:48) suggests present-day liberalism denotes a 
‘commitment to principles and practices of individual rights and responsibility in the context 
of equality of opportunity, the rule of law, freedom of expression and association, a mainly 
market economy and governments chosen in multi-party free elections’. This commitment is 
often argued to be at least partly responsible for the kinds of internationally sponsored 
‘peace’ seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia and East Timor 
(Chandler 2006; Duffield 2007; Woodward 2007; Pugh et al 2009). In these contexts liberal 
peace and state building are practiced through the top-down implementation of formal 
governance institutions, with the end goal being the creation of a liberal and rational-legal 
Weberian state (Barnett 2006; Jahn 2007; Richmond and Franks 2009). Indeed, as argued by 
Schmeidl and Karohail (2009), the ‘McDonaldisation’ of state- and peace-building since the 
end of the Cold War has witnessed the speedy rolling out of standard liberal democratic 
institutional templates in a number of diverse locations.37  
For those working with a HPOs lens, the standardisation of liberal interventionism is 
counterproductive to the project of peace building because it ignores and even represses the 
capacity of non-state sources of order to provide essential public services such as security and 
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justice. This repression renders local societies passive, thereby weakening both a sense of 
local responsibility for overcoming problems and the local ownership of solutions. Thus the 
literature highlights persistent instability and underdevelopment in countries that have 
undergone international interventions to show that, whether formal or informal, modes of 
governance that are disembedded from societies’ values cannot create legitimate public 
authorities (Wilder & Lister 2007; Richmond 2009; Schmeidl and Karohail 2009). In an 
instructive case study, Boege et al’s (2009b) heavily referenced paper documents how Timor-
Leste underwent a top down state building programme that largely ignored existing informal 
governance institutions and concentrated governance capacity in the capital city. They argue 
that policymakers effectively took a ‘risk’ with the decision to side-line the very institutions 
that had provided the population with ordering logics during the region’s occupation by 
Indonesia (Boege et al 2009b:607). Indeed they even suggest the interveners’ exclusionary 
liberal project may have contributed to a return to violence in 2006/7. 
For the HPO lens, therefore, the liberal peace is neither emancipatory, nor does it 
automatically lead to peace and stronger state institutions. Instead, authors suggest, local 
societies may have more affinity for local non-state authorities such as traditional leaders, 
religious figures, landlords, entrepreneurs and warlords, than for the panoply of liberal 
institutions and democratic procedures that accompany contemporary international 
interventions.38 Indeed, for Boege et al (2009:607), as ‘members of traditional communities, 
people are tied into a network of social relations and a web of mutual obligations, and these 
obligations are much more powerful than obligations as a ‘citizen’. People obey not the rules 
of the state, but the rules of their group. Legitimacy rests with the leaders of that group, not 
with the state authorities.’39 For Mac Ginty (2012:34), the attention to legitimacy within the 
HPOs literature acts as a counterweight to liberal state-building models predicated on the 
assumption that liberal governance institutions reflect universal human desires. While for 
Boege et al (2009:606) it uncovers how public authorities may draw upon all three of 
Weber’s ideal types of legitimacy – rational, traditional and charismatic - in their struggles to 
create political orders (Weber 1968:46). Schmeidl and Karohail (2009) capture these ideas 
with their description of the different value-systems upon which legitimacy may be built in 
Afghanistan’s hybrid political order. These include the customary practices of tribal elders 
that have little knowledge of the state; the military might that allows strongmen to dominate 
illicit economies and provide public goods to client communities; the internationally backed 
regional warlords who occupy elected positions within the state’s formal system; and the 
religious authorities that have historically rallied the nation’s diverse ethno-linguistic groups 
beneath a single banner in times of occupation. Through such depictions of the diverse 
norms, value,s and material resources and symbolic repertoires available in such contexts, the 
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HPOs literature projects its analysis of the production of public authority beyond the local 
and into national or international spheres.  
Although dominated by its critique of the liberal peace, the authors within the HPOs literature 
also examine the production of public authority and provision of public goods in states that 
have not recently experienced an intervention. However, even in these contexts they look to 
the interactions between communities, states and international actors to tease out lessons for 
peace and state building elsewhere. For example, in a number of studies Menkhaus (2008) 
introduces the concept of the ‘mediated state’ to explain the process by which the Somali 
government partners, co-opts, or sub-contracts state security functions to localised coalitions 
of religious, clan and business leaders. However Menkhaus (2006b:85) argues that while this 
practice is central to the government’s desire to maintain even a token of authority in 
Somalia’s fractured polity, it is also driven by the various interests of non-state actors. With 
respect to the latter, these interests include the establishment of secure trading markets, the 
religious stewardship of local courts and the maintenance of clan-based patterns of 
domination. Thus a mix of traditional, religious, market and state based logics are seen to 
provide ‘organic’ forms of public order (Menkhaus 2006b:74). Yet Menkhaus (2006b:102) 
also takes care to accord agency to ordinary Somalis, who he suggests, fearful of predation by 
central powers, prevent Somalia’s localised ‘polities’ from forming larger political units. 
For Menkhaus, Somalis’ aversion to central authority allows localised authorities to provide 
justice and security when ‘the conditions are right’ (Menkhaus 2006b:85). This includes 
dispute resolution and the establishment of private police forces by local leaders. However, 
beyond the absence of clumsy international state builders and the overlapping interests of 
local power holders, Menkhaus is less clear about what these conditions may entail. Indeed 
he talks in terms of a general ‘trend’ towards the desire for stability (2006b:83). At most, 
given Somalia’s localised secessionist movements and the lack of a monopoly of violence, 
Menkhaus recommends that the weak government, faced with few options, learn from the 
experience of Europe’s early leaders. In this scenario Somalia’s government would continue 
to work with, manipulate and manoeuvre among local centres of authority in ‘a promising 
variation on the theme’ of state building (Menkhaus 2006b:104). Argued to already be the 
reality for other African countries, this is depicted as the only choice if the Somali state 
wishes to extend its jurisdiction within its borders. Although Menkhaus appears to have 
applied the idea of searching for ‘practical hybrids’ to broad state-society relations, as we will 
discuss in the conclusion, such calls leave the HPOs lens open to a number of criticisms, 
particularly by those worried by the translation of European state building experiences to 
foreign contexts, or the possible excusing of violence in support of a long run state building 
projects (Booth 2012).      
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Political Settlements Analysis 
Introduction 
The analysis of political settlements grew out of the attempts of the new institutional 
economics (NIE) literature to explain differences in the development trajectories of countries 
with assumed similar starting conditions. Within the latter literature institutions provide the 
necessary incentive structures to encourage development.40 These incentives are 
conceptualised as sets of rules and rights that lower the transaction costs associated with 
economic and political activity. Although the NIE literature focused on property rights, the 
argument is also applied to other entitlements such as personal security and access to 
justice.41 Indeed within the NIE literature public goods such as these are ideally provided by 
formal, state based institutions, with informal institutions offering second best or inferior 
alternatives (North 1990; Stiglitz 2000; Meagher 2007). However, despite this promising 
start, the NIE is largely unable to answer why right- or entitlement-providing formal 
institutions are often inefficient or serve particularistic interests, or why they cannot be easily 
replicated across contexts; the transferability problem in development.     
To account for these realities a divergence from neo-classical economic thought becomes 
necessary. Thus some authors have begun to argue that governance institutions require 
legitimacy to enforce rights and that these rights confer important privileges. Moreover many 
suggest that there is nothing intrinsically efficient about the ability, or fair about the manner, 
in which institutions confer rights. Instead, the distribution of rights is seen to reflect the 
unique patterns of control and authority over assets found in each society (Dahlman 1980, 
213-214). Observers, therefore, can only begin to understand institutions that provide public 
goods through a historical political economy analysis of the underlying balance of power (Di 
John and Putzel 2009:4). This requires investigating conflicts and negotiations between elites, 
and between elites and non-elites. This includes contests between, and among, those who 
occupy positions within the state apparatus and those that do not. Termed the ‘political 
settlement’, the balance or distribution of power between these contending social groups is 
placed at the heart of the relationship between public authority and public goods.  
Along with an interest in the contests and negotiations shaping institutions, the political 
settlement literature develops several more of the NIE’s defining features. Firstly it 
understands informal institutions, including social conventions, customs, traditions, beliefs 
and codes of behaviour, as integral components of formal, state based institutions. Yet while 
the NIE depicts informal institutions as strong constraints to rapid institutional change, the 
political settlements literature is somewhat positive about the utility of informal institutions in 
conflict-affected or transitioning societies (Menocal 2009). Indeed it suggests they may be 
the only viable option to promote political and economic stability where the imposition of 
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liberal institutions may upset the prevailing balance of power and induce conflict among 
competing groups (North et al 2009:40). Secondly the NIE’s explicit rejection of the neo-
classical assumption of instrumental rationality is harnessed by the political settlement 
authors to place ideas and ideologies alongside rent seeking as a significant determinant of 
behaviour (Denzau and North 1994; North et al 2012: Chap 1).42 This builds upon the NIE’s 
depiction of informal institutions as mental models derived from culture and locality. Thirdly 
the political settlements literature has borrowed heavily from NIE’s use of historical 
institutionalism. However where the latter posits path dependency and belief systems to 
account for long run processes of incremental institutional change, the former uses history to 
identify the critical junctures and actors that catalyse rapid institutional change (North 1985; 
Pierre and Peters 2000:43).43 Lastly where the NIE literature’s acceptance of informal 
processes allows for ‘culturalist’ interpretations of the inter-subjective construction of 
institutions, the political settlement approach uses its focus on coalitions of power holders 
and ongoing negotiations to emphasise that constant collective action is needed to sustain or 
change institutions (Hall and Taylor 1996:8; AusAid 2011:92).        
Before moving on, it is important to note that authors working with the concept of political 
settlements are keen to distinguish them from power sharing agreements or governments of 
national unity. Whereas the latter are seen as formal institutional arrangements, sometimes 
imposed by outsiders as part of peace-building interventions, political settlements are often 
defined as ‘ongoing’ agreements between elites and institutions, both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ 
(DFID 2010; Parks and Cole 2010; Gleasen et al 2011; AusAid 2011).44 Not only does this 
extend the variety of institutions involved in political settlements analysis, as with the other 
two identified approaches it suggests that the production of public authority is a continuous 
process. 
 
Public goods providing coalitions  
A central contribution of the political settlement literature is the suggestion that not all rent-
seeking activity by elites is harmful. Instead it asks analysts to carefully distinguish between 
instances of unproductive rent seeking with no benefit for wider sections of society and rent 
seeking that may result in the legitimisation of claims to authority through public goods 
provision (North et al 2012:chapter 1). Yet it avoids normative assumptions through its 
assertion that there are no self-perpetuating evolutionary forces driving societies towards this 
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desired outcome. This idea also appears in de Waal’s (2009) concept of ‘political 
marketplaces’, which urges a re-examination of patronage systems that in certain 
circumstances may be describable as locally grounded, legitimate governance mechanisms. 
Although running against the liberal and rational-legal models of public authority, the 
combined force of rent seeking elites, expectant client populations and a balanced distribution 
of power is seen to have the potential to lead to ‘developmental regimes’ or ‘developmental 
coalitions’ (Parks and Cole 2010:22; Laws 2012:17). These regimes are compared to post 
World War II East Asian polities, such as South Korea and Japan, within which elites secured 
their rents by gradually responding to broad demands for economic and political rights. This 
process opened up opportunities for increasing numbers of the population to partake in 
economic and political activity.45  
As with the other surveyed literature on the production of public authority, many of the 
political settlement authors do not confine the provision of public goods to formal actors and 
institutions. Rather the approach suggests that the inclusion of informal institutions into 
political settlements is the only reliable method of gaining legitimacy for those claiming 
public authority in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. This is because informal 
institutions often reflect the balance of power underpinning elite coalitions and, as they are 
based on local social conventions, customs, traditions, and beliefs, they allow elites to 
arrange the provision of public goods in socially acceptable ways. Therefore the imposition 
of liberal governance institutions may unwittingly upset the distribution of rights and 
privileges amongst contending groups. In turn, this can force public goods to be distributed in 
ways that prevent elites from fulfilling their obligations to client groups or give rivals greater 
access to resources than were previously available. In both scenarios elites or disgruntled 
groups may seize the opportunity to violently appropriate a greater share of the total rents 
within a settlement. Thus political settlements that are negotiated between informal and 
formal actors at multiple levels - local, regional, state, and international - with diverse and 
sometimes competing institutional arrangements, are seen to be the best means of avoiding 
violence. 
Two distinct approaches to the provision of public goods can be discerned within the political 
settlements literature. The first depicts violence as the central problem affecting developing 
countries and adopts North, Wallis and Weingast’s (2009) framework of ‘limited access 
orders’ (LAOs). At their core, LAOs describe societies within which the underlying political 
settlement confines access to political and economic opportunities to a narrow coalition of 
power holders. The concept is contrasted to ‘open access orders’ within which access to 
political and economic opportunities are structured in competitive terms through markets, 
elections and merit. Peace in LAOs rests on the ability of power holders, conceived as elites 
or groups with the ability to deploy violence, to negotiate credible coalitions and limit non-
members’ access to economic and political opportunities. These opportunities represent the 
interests of coalition members and can include economic rents. The framework suggests that 
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violence occurs in LAOs when elites or groups with the capacity for violence perceive the 
level of rents they collect as unrepresentative of the distribution of power. Parks and Cole 
(2010:15-17) frame this change in perceptions as a loss of legitimacy and suggest it may be 
spurned by excluded groups or elites as well as members of the central coalition. However 
when in a credible coalition the latter actors may conclude that they are better off peacefully 
strengthening their patrimonial networks and enforcing each other’s domination of political 
and economic opportunities than rent- seeking through violent means.  
For North et al (2009:17), therefore, ‘[s]ystematic rent-creation through limited access in a 
natural state is not simply a method of lining the pockets of the dominant coalition; it is the 
essential means of controlling violence’. However they also argue that strengthening, 
institutionalising and legitimising the coalition’s domination of rents can be achieved through 
the provision of public goods, such as security and justice, to the coalition’s supporters. This 
can include the gradual extension of political and economic rights (opportunities) to greater 
numbers of the society. Indeed, as Goodhand and Mansfield (2010) have argued in the case 
of Afghanistan, given the right incentives predatory actors such as warlords may choose to 
use their domination of illicit economies and patrimonial ‘joint extraction regimes’ to build 
political legitimacy through the provision of security and social services to client 
communities (Snyder 2006). Although localised and prone to reversals in direction, these 
processes can even drive development and the centralisation of violence capacity as elites 
turn their rents into legitimate industries and secure formal positions within the state. 
Moreover as part of this transition they may seek to fulfill the changing expectations of both 
local populations and international interveners, who may have adopted or brought with them 
new governance norms. Yet, as others have shown, the domination of rents and legitimacy 
can also be achieved through forms of inequality, predation and exclusion, which can lead to 
the politicisation of identities and a rise in insecurity (Stewart 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Østby 2008). Thus, as a recent collection of case studies using this 
approach suggests, to understand the creation of public authority, predict long run stability 
and interpret the political settlements underlying different LAOs the underlying political 
settlement must be carefully investigated through context specific and historical political 
analysis (North et al 2012).  
The second approach to political settlements is found among donors and practitioners keen to 
interpret the trajectories of ambitious interventions, including state building programmes and 
localised development projects. On the one hand, they use the concept to suggest that 
predictable state building programmes are unlikely under exclusionary political settlements or 
where major inequalities between contending groups exist (WDR 2011; DFID 2012; Di John 
and Putzel 2012). As a corrective they suggest that programmes should be realised through 
both formal and informal means (AusAid 2011:32).46 Indeed the World Bank’s influential 
report Conflict, Security and Development (WDR 2011) encourages practitioners to foster 
‘collaborative, inclusive-enough coalitions’ which include ‘broader segments of society - 
local governments, business, labour, civil society movements, [and] in some cases opposition 
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parties’. Yet, at the same time, there is a suggestion that if left to operate outside the state’s 
influence informal institutions may provide ‘legitimacy’ to those wishing to challenge the 
state (Di John and Putzel 2012:vi).  
While on the other hand, practitioners use the political settlements approach to understand 
how development programmes may be received in sub-national contexts. Interpreting 
political settlements as ‘rolling agreements’ made up of powerful ‘actors, interests and 
institutions’, they argue that the alignment of local elite interests with broader sections of 
society will determine the success or failure of localised projects  (Parks and Cole 2010:viii). 
Proponents of this perspective are careful to argue that states and societies cannot be viewed 
as homogenous entities. Rather, their internal divisions and conflicts must be seen as part of 
each country’s larger political settlement (Laws 2012:1). This approach allows them to posit 
the importance of understanding ‘secondary political settlements’, which Parks and Cole 
(2012:18) define as ‘the arrangements among powerful local elites to control political 
competition and governance below the national level (i.e., province, state, district, city, 
village, etc.)’. Particularly important in conflict- affected or peripheral regions, this emerging 
idea recognises the centrality of the relationship between local political contexts, central 
governments and international forces for peace building and developmental outcomes.  
 
Viewing political settlements across different levels of analysis 
Although the political settlement framework is relatively new, it is worth highlighting its 
application at both the national and local levels in conflict-affected states.  Adopting a long 
run historical analysis, Kaiser and Wolters (2012) explore the nature of post-colonial political 
authority and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) from 1965 to the 
present. They adopt a comparative approach by breaking the period into three phases and 
compare each period. Within each period a central elite coalition derives rents from the 
country’s abundant natural resources, whilst enjoying the patronage of different international 
powers and the freedom to funnel wealth to private offshore depositories. This combination 
of factors provides few incentives for coalition members to use rents for public goods 
provision or to remain committed to the coalition and to strengthen each other’s claims to 
public authority. Accordingly early stability within each period quickly gives way to 
corruption, predation and violence as elites faced with disgruntled sub-national groups strip 
the state of its resources to maintain their own support bases. This process is accompanied by 
the increased repression of opposition groups, often with the aid of foreign powers. Although 
prolonging each regime’s downfall, in each period outside support came at the cost of foreign 
interests setting up their own extractive operations. For the authors, this further contributes to 
the long-run fragmentation of the DRC’s weak coalitions as elites, including military leaders, 
break ranks with the coalition to join outsiders plundering the country’s peripheries. 
Connecting these processes to favourable international resource markets, the authors show 
how the DRC’s elites face a lack of incentives to legitimise their rule through public goods 
provision, ultimately hampering prospects of long run development and entrenching a 
‘vicious circle’ (Anderson 2005:9).    
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Beall and Ngonyama’s (2009:3) study of post-apartheid South Africa adopts political 
settlement analyses to interpret the role of customary authorities in averting violence and 
creating ‘development coalitions’ in sub-national contexts. It provides a detailed examination 
of how secondary political settlements interact with national level political settlements. The 
authors argue that South Africa’s national level elites, drawing upon colonial experiences, 
recognised the ability of customary authorities to adapt to the changing political environment 
and occupy governance roles in the country’s new political order. Accordingly, through their 
connections with local actors they utilised the power of ‘ethnic symbolism, indigenous rituals 
and customary authority’ to win national elections, especially in constituencies historically 
neglected by central governments. For the authors, this kickstarted an ongoing ‘iterative’ 
process which acknowledged the interests of traditional authorities and ushered in legislation 
that brought them into horizontally connected secondary political settlements (Beall and 
Ngonyama 2009:31). Although this involved ‘trade-offs’ within which the basic requirements 
of liberal democracy were relaxed to include customary institutions and authorities, it 
allowed democratic elements, including localised elections, to be introduced into local 
politics. In this manner, the authors suggest South Africa’s customary leaders and their 
institutions were accommodated inside a ‘hybrid political order’ (Beall and Ngonyama 
2009:5).   Furthermore the authors argue that these accommodations gave national leaders the 
ability to ‘fast track’ the creation of multi-sited elite coalitions that could head off repeated 
bouts of political violence in South Africa’s KwaZulu-Natal province.  
The authors also examine local actors with links to South Africa’s ruling party and to 
traditional authorities, and their key role in brokering inclusive political settlements. In the 
case of Greater Durban the brokers included representatives of the local government, 
business leaders, NGOs, activists, educators and politicians. They combined their ability to 
operate across state/society divides to create developmental coalitions that encompassed the 
interests of labour movements, community organisations, youth groups, business and 
traditional authorities. Indeed the authors suggest that the opportunities created by South 
Africa’s pre-existing institutions and repeated elections were insufficient for the creation of 
inclusive secondary settlements. Thus, visionary leaders and local brokers were needed to 
seize these conditions and create inclusive settlements that could drive development. For 
Beall and Ngonyama (2009:6), uncovering the role played by ‘politically astute and 
committed leaders’ within South Africa’s primary and secondary political settlements is vital 
to understanding local development trajectories.  
 
Conclusion: What do the approaches tell us? 
The beginning of the paper argued that the identified approaches share three perspectives on 
the production and exercise of public authority in conflict-affected and transitioning 
countries. However our subsequent review of the emerging literature suggests that authors are 
developing these perspectives in a number of ways. First, the approaches tend to explicitly or 
implicitly use a classical Weberian understanding of authority, retaining his thesis that 
authority implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, which is predicated on a ‘belief’ in the 
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legitimacy of a given actor’s or institution’s governance practices (Weber 1966:328). This 
belief is often portrayed as contingent on the provision of public goods in a manner that 
accords with the values and norms held among wider society. In particular, the provision of 
security and justice serves as a common, but not always successful, method for establishing 
public authority and exercising power in socially acceptable ways. Second, in their search for 
links between public authority and public goods provision, most of the reviewed authors 
move beyond Weber’s three ideal-types of authority: rational-legal, traditional and 
charismatic. Instead they recognise that public authority is exercised by institutions that are 
neither fish nor fowl, and have given these emerging forms labels such as ‘twilight 
institutions’, ‘hybrid governance’ and ‘practical norms’. Indeed they show that public 
authority is not the prerogative of the state and that it can be exercised by a multitude of more 
or less transient institutions situated at different spatial levels. Lastly they view social reality 
as characterised by ongoing contests, conflicts and collaborations. They argue, therefore, that 
public authority is an emergent property, always in production and never definitely formed. 
Exploring these perspectives in further depth, the remainder of the paper draws three 
suggestions from the reviewed approaches. Each is useful for those aiming to understand the 
production of public authority in conflict-affected and transitioning regions.   
 
Recognise the diverse ways of creating and maintaining public authority 
The three approaches discussed above identify public authority as dependent on a belief in 
the legitimacy of different actors’ claims to authority. Furthermore they suggest that 
legitimacy can be gained through the provision of public goods, particularly justice and 
security. In this sense the approaches retain the fragile states discourse’s suggestion that 
public authority is the product of a reciprocal relationship between rulers and the ruled. 
However, by understanding the production of public authority as contextually contingent, the 
three approaches reject the first strand of the fragile states discourse’s tendency to elevate the 
liberal state-builders’ ideal type of legitimacy - Weber’s rational-legal type - to a universal 
model for this relationship. Indeed which forms of public authority are considered legitimate 
is seen to be dependent on the values and norms animating each context. Thus, whether or not 
various actors’ claims to public authority are considered legitimate depends on their ability to 
successfully evoke, consciously or subconsciously, these values and norms through their 
governance practices. The actors involved in the production of public authority, the material 
resources and symbolic repertoires drawn upon, and the type of security or justice provided, 
and to whom, differs from context to context. This has important implications for 
understanding and empirically investigating the production of public authority. 
As argued, the reviewed approaches adopt a relativistic conceptualisation of authority. Indeed 
their shared criticism of the claims to the universality and transferability of rational-legal 
models of governance, put forth by authors associated with the first strand of the fragile state 
discourse, to some extent echo Weber’s own critique of rational-legal modes of authority.47 
                                                          
47
 In the Spirit of Capitalism and the Protestant Ethic (1952:181-2), Weber warned that the rationalist spirit of 
modernity had achieved a momentum of its own, and that under capitalism, the rationalist order had become an 
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This is especially the case with the hybrid political order lens that tends to see external liberal 
state-building models as alien to local societal values and norms. Moreover its authors 
suggest that such interventions can bring with them governance practices based on efficiency, 
rational calculation and control that may be peacefully resisted or violently rejected by 
populations struggling to retain their dignity (Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 
2012). For its part, the political settlements literature’s more top down focus suggests that 
enterprising elites may use the reordering demanded by rational-legal state building 
programmes to persecute rivals and appropriate greater rents. However none of the 
approaches accept that societies’ interests and social norms will be changed in the short term, 
much less abandoned, once they come to understand the possibilities of rational-legal modes 
of ordering, democracy and market economy; a favoured explanation for deploying more of 
the same in state-building efforts in contexts such as Iraq and Afghanistan even if such 
remedies do not appear to be working immediately (Chandler 2010). Instead they suggest that 
claims to authority, of whatever sort, will only be legitimated if they accord with, 
accommodate, or complement the beliefs and expectations already prevalent among wide 
sections of society. In this respect the approaches concur with a growing number of authors 
critiquing the narrow understanding of legitimacy found within liberal peace-building and 
state-building efforts (Milliken and Krause 2002; Francois and Sud 2006; Grindle 2007; 
Papagianni 2008; Bellina et al. 2009; Rothstein 2009). As Roberts (2009) summarises, for 
these authors rational-legal and procedurally democratic institutions will rarely garner the 
level of legitimacy needed to promote stability and development if they fail to address the 
social expectations of end-users. 
Adding to these arguments, the reviewed approaches acknowledge that both in political 
orders that are sometimes erroneously described as stateless, such as Somalia, and in those 
emerging from periods of violence, such as South Africa, a variety of state and, sometimes 
illiberal, non-state actors and institutions can win legitimacy by providing basic public goods 
such as security and justice. In some cases groups of actors with shared or overlapping 
interests may even promote developmental activity, such as the running of safe markets and 
the securing of basic property rights through local courts. While, as the HPOs lens argues, in 
other contexts local authorities may work together to overcome the demands of imposed 
governance institutions and develop strategies to cope with oppression. For their part, 
investigations of the production of public authority from below show how protection 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
‘iron cage’ in which humanity was increasingly imprisoned ‘perhaps until the last ton of fossilized coal is 
burnt’. Weber, of course, is not the only modern social scientist who has criticized contemporary forms of 
domination for having a crushing effect on humans. The late 19th and early 20th century was a period marked 
by a veritable explosion in sociological critiques of modern forms of authority and production. In stark contrast 
to the optimism of the Enlightenment writers who celebrated humanity’s emancipation from the backward 
beliefs of magico-religious thought and clerical tyranny, modern writers formulated theories of subtle 
domination. For example, Marx and Durkheim described how the herding of people into the urban workshops of 
the industrial revolution ‘imposed upon mankind monotonous and unceasing labour’ (Durkheim 1984:187); 
ultimately ‘conver[ting] the labourer into a crippled monstrosity, by forcing his detail dexterity at the expense of 
a world of productive capabilities and instincts’ (Marx 1999:209). Eventually, Habermas, as the most visible 
exponent of the Frankfurt School, would summarise a critique of modernity as a colonisation of the ‘lifeworld’, 
which is to say a ‘penetration of forms of economic and administrative rationality into areas of action that resist 
being converted over to the media of money and power because they are specialized in cultural transmission, 
social integration and child rearing’ (1987:330). 
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arrangements negotiated between several different actors can lead to the gradual pluralisation 
of those able to claim public authority. With its concentration on the construction and make-
up of coalitions, the political settlements literature even suggests that previously violent 
actors can work across national and local levels to foster peace through the accommodation 
of violence specialists with credible commitments to safeguard one another’s rents. The three 
approaches, therefore, share an encouragement to empirically examine the full range of actors 
involved in the production of public authority regardless of how they are categorised 
Through a focus on legitimacy and the provision of public goods, regardless of the type of 
actors or institutions providing them, the three approaches concur with the more relativistic 
conceptualisation of authority in the fragile states discourse’s second strand. However they 
go beyond Weber’s three ideal types of legitimate authority to examine the diverse ways in 
which claimants legitimise and exercise public authority, including the range of material 
resources and symbolic repertoires used in these processes. However, while suggesting that 
the production of public authority often requires a variety of practices and resources, each 
approach retains a focus on particular governance practices and concentrates on the use of 
one or the other resource. For example, those examining public authority from below produce 
rich descriptions of the various ways in which local actors strategically appropriate different 
symbolic repertoires to legitimise their claims to public authority. For instance, various 
‘twilight institutions’ such as traditional authorities, vigilantes, and insurgents are shown to 
mimic the symbolic and material practices of the state as a way to legitimise their claims to 
public authority. While the public authority from below literature challenges Weber’s 
categories through nuanced understanding of institutions’ abilities to claim public authority 
through the idea of the state, the concept of hybridity is used to focus on the interactions 
between an ever expanding list of governance ‘logics’. These logics may be located in the 
local, national or international realms and, among others, contain traditional, religious, 
bureaucratic, market, or transnational values and norms. Although different logics may be 
more easily associated with different material resources and symbolic repertoires, such as the 
physical protection of markets or the use of religious principles to arbitrate disputes in 
Somalia, the crucial point remains that these logics must have some resonance among wider 
society in order to produce public authority. Indeed many of the authors working with the 
idea of hybridity focus on the interactions between those logics deemed to already be present 
in society and those forcefully introduced from elsewhere. This allows them to suggest that 
hybridity does not describe the creation of new logics, but rather the adaptation and 
coexistence of existing norms, values and modes of ordering. 
Even the focus on the extraction of material resources within political settlements analysis 
suggests that securing legitimacy may be as much about forging coalitions between wielders 
of violence that respect locally accepted values and norms of resource distribution, as it may 
be about elites’ abilities to harness Weber’s ideal types of legitimate authority. Indeed, 
although initially resting on patrimonial practices, the literature suggests that the credibility, 
legitimacy and longevity of these coalitions may come to be based on the ability of members 
to turn a diverse range of expropriated material resources into increasingly inclusive rewards, 
including rights, or, less positively, to uphold popular exclusionary discourses and barriers 
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that limit the political and economic opportunities of particular social groups. These 
considerations are well illustrated in the case of Afghanistan where it is suggested that 
members of the elite coalition underpinning the country’s political settlement have used their 
privileged access to material resources to win legitimacy by according with the norms and 
values among different sections of society, including growing expectations that their coercive 
power be formalised within state institutions (even if this has not led to increased security for 
the majority of end-users). With regard to legitimating public authority, therefore, our three 
approaches appear to consider material resources and symbolic repertoires as two sides of the 
same coin.   
Although differing in their focus, all the approaches show how legitimate claims to authority 
and the exercise of power are intimately related to the diversity of values and norms and the 
resources that can be used to evoke them within the fragmented polities of conflict-affected 
regions. Unsurprisingly, capturing a contextually contingent understanding of the production 
of public authority is a tall order; a reality which somewhat complicates the possibility of 
comparative research. Despite these obstacles we argue that the reviewed approaches have 
three main advantages over the fragile states discourse.  
Firstly, as already suggested in the preceding discussion of legitimacy, they re-orientate the 
contemporary interest in reciprocal relations between ruler and ruled, found in the fragile 
state discourse’s first strand, away from a reductionist concentration on bureaucratic, 
rational-legal remedies for security and development. This somewhat challenges the 
contemporary focus on technical and institutional fixes and the search for quantifiable 
indicators of state capacity and institutional strength that defines liberal state-building efforts.  
Secondly, emphasising that legitimacy has to do with people’s norms, beliefs and everyday 
interactions allows analysts to look into the variety of resources and practices that actors and 
institutions may draw upon to legitimise their claims to, or exercise of, public authority 
(Bellina et al. 2009). However, although we applaud the efforts of the three approaches to 
recognise the diversity of forms of authority exercised in conflict-affected regions, we wish to 
strike a note of caution: the HPOs literature’s use of the term ‘logics’ risks reifying these 
forms of authority. This is particularly problematic given the diverse and shifting nature of 
the resources and legitimate modes of governance that may be drawn upon by claimants to 
public authority.48 Indeed it would be a drastic simplification mistake to think of the symbolic 
repertoires and modes of resource governance deployed in contests over public authority as 
derived from static, self-contained structures, with built-in logics of authority that control the 
behaviour of people living in conflict-affected countries. Thus we suggest that these terms go 
against the spirit of much of the literature, which emphasises the tactical use of these 
resources, holds prior-hybridisation to be an unavoidable feature of the practice of public 
authority and highlights the ever-changing nature of social formations. Moreover we suggest 
that these terms largely fail to capture the reality that many claims to public authority are 
rejected on the ground by locals who do not passively follow either endogenous or exogenous 
                                                          
48
 As Boege et al. (2009b:n4) acknowledge a similar criticism is applicable to their use of terms such as 
‘customary’ and ‘traditional: ‘It would be misleading, however, to think of this traditional realm as 
unchangeable and static.’ 
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logics (Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond 2011). Rather, as Cummins (2013: 157) contends, public 
authority is a complex process that is negotiated by local leaders as they use existing 
resources to meet community needs and to pursue individual agendas. Indeed, when 
combined with notions of ‘tradition’ or ‘custom’, talk of logics may even leave the hybridity 
literature open to accusations of culturalism. 
Lastly, the three approaches share an understanding of public authority as an ‘emergent 
property’, always in production and never definitively formed.49 This suggests that public 
authority must be consistently practiced or performed by those claiming it. Combined with 
the need for authorities to accord with local expectations and provide public goods, this 
depiction of public authority recognises the agency of both power holders and the wider 
groups they govern, however subtle this may be. This is most evident in the authority from 
below literature’s concentration on the everyday, localised governance practices and actors 
that produce public authority, and in the hybridity literature’s argument that all political 
orders should be understood as hybridised to differing extents. However, it is also identifiable 
in the political settlements literature’s emphasis on the need for elites to continuously 
reaffirm the credibility of their coalition through ongoing negotiations and accommodations, 
that, in some cases, involve providing public goods to ever-expanding sections of society. 
In sum, for the reviewed approaches the actors and institutions, material resources and 
symbolic repertoires, and values and norms that form the basic building blocks of legitimacy 
are always in motion and subject to change. For that reason diligent empirical research is 
required to uncover the concrete interactions and practices that produce public authority. 
Through their identification of a variety of claims to, and ways of, exercising public 
authority, the three approaches add considerably to our understanding of the production of 
public authority in conflict-affected regions. Yet, as we will argue in the next section, this 
way of understanding the production of public authority not only differentiates the 
approaches from the fragile states discourse, it also puts them at odds with many sociological 
descriptions of state-building. 
 
Open-ended processes of social change  
In a cautionary call, Meagher (2012:1075) argues that a Gestalt shift from a Eurocentric 
Weberian notion of the state as a set of key functions, including the ‘legitimate monopoly on 
violence’ and rational bureaucratic authority (i.e. the first strand of the fragile state 
discourse), towards Tillian historical sociological models of state formation has taken place 
in contemporary studies of ‘hybrid governance’ (Tilly 1985, Plen 1993, Elias 1994). For 
many of these historical depictions of social change the legitimacy of Weber’s monopoly on 
legitimacy was arrived at through a sequence of necessarily violent eliminations.50 Meagher 
                                                          
49
 The notion of emergent properties has a long pedigree in the social sciences, from Mill to Durkheim, Parsons 
and Luhmann. More recently, Hansen and Stepputat (2006) have used the notion to describe the production of 
sovereignty. At its most basic it suggests that some properties cannot be reduced to the sum of their parts. 
50
 Tilly (1985:169) argues that the first phase of state formation in Europe was characterised by protection 
agreements between state-builders, which he compared to ‘criminal’ racketeers, and weaker members of society. 
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(2012), therefore, warns that this new focus may work to naturalise and thereby justify the 
chaotic, sometimes violent, nature of resource extraction, governance and security 
arrangements in conflict-affected and transitioning regions. For instance, it could support 
policies that assume the positive outcome of violence or the legitimacy of predatory local 
authorities, potentially encouraging apathy on the part of observers of oppression and 
conflict. More worryingly still, acquiescence may become assistance as donors provide local 
elites with resources to compete in supposedly evolutionary violent contests, allowing local 
and international actors to paper over their lack of interest in building legitimate governance 
institutions and focus on unrestrained resource extraction in its place.51 These warnings raise 
important questions for those wishing to utilise the new approaches to public authority and 
public goods provision either for the purposes of analysis or for the purposes of 
development/security interventions. 
While, the HPOs literature largely uses historical sociological models to reject the idea of 
leaving state formation to local authorities, suggesting it would be ‘fatalistic – and cynical – 
to leave it all to an ‘organic’ historical process, likely to mean ‘bloodshed, injustice and 
misery – as the history of European state formation amply demonstrates’, it simultaneously 
calls for a reorientation of external assistance away from models of state-building based on 
rational-legal ideal-types and towards an understanding of, and engagement with, non-state 
actors and institutions (Boege et al 2008:15). In support of this view authors point to the 
hidden capacities of local ordering logics and highlight their ability to provide public goods 
in partnership with international interveners (Boege et al. 2008:15). Thus Booth (2012) urges 
working with ‘practical hybrids’; institutions that marry ‘modern professional standards or 
scientific principles with the moral economy or established practices of localised areas.  
Despite this apparent embrace of alternative forms of public authority, our review did not 
find studies that ‘emphasize the constructive role of violence in clearing away the wreckage 
of dysfunctional post-colonial states and catalysing more authentic processes of state 
formation from locally-embedded systems of order and authority’ (Meagher 2012:99). The 
furthest they appear to go is to suggest as Menkhaus (2006a: 104) does that the form of 
‘mediated state’ which was practiced in Europe during the Middle Ages could be a promising 
theme through which to build a new form of public authority because it would acknowledge 
the reality of many fragile states.  Furthermore, as with our brief analysis, a recent literature 
survey of studies of security provision in contexts describable as HPOs found a diversity of 
outcomes and records a distinct ambiguity surrounding the direction of social change in such 
contexts (Luckham and Kirk 2012). The literature’s use of the notion of hybridity, therefore, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
However the former’s interests were not in building states, but in acquiring material resources through coercive 
action. Similarly Elias (1994) also uses the French experience to argue that state-building’s first phase involves 
struggles among individuals and groups over un-monopolised, yet scarce, resources. For these authors, it is only 
by passing through these initial periods of violence that a second, perhaps unintended, phase consisting of 
dialogue between rulers and the ruled can begin to institutionalise the use of force and establish statehood based 
on a rational-legal bureaucracy. In a variation on this theme, Olson’s (1993) description of China’s ‘stationary 
bandits’ suggests that some predatory actors may find incentives to introduce state like institutions, including 
tax systems. For a good treatment of Tilly see Leander (2004).   
51
 Meagher (2012:1082) cites studies by Reno (2001,2004) and Ferguson (2006) to support the argument that the 
outsourcing of security and governance functions to local strong men in resource rich countries may allow 
authorities to ‘bypass’ the cost of comprehensive state building. 
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can be read as a reminder that attempts to work with local public authorities should proceed 
with caution and be premised on thorough understandings of the local context. Indeed what 
may appear as the legitimate provision of public goods may in fact be a protection racket 
(Titeca 2009; Rayemaekers 2010). In other words the difference between the provision of 
public goods and organised crime is sometimes razor-thin and the legitimacy of the 
supposedly ‘local’ or ‘traditional’ cannot be assumed. 
For those investigating the production of authority from below, social change is located in the 
everyday governance practices and strategies deployed in ‘semi-autonomous social systems’ 
(Moore 1978), ‘local political arenas’ (Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003), ‘local 
politics’ (Lund 2006; 2008), and ‘arenas of negotiation’ (Hagmann and Péclard 2010). These 
locations are characterised by the conflicts, competitions and contestations that accompany 
claims to public authority and they tend to place a relatively high causal emphasis on the 
tactical agency and interests of different social groups. By and large, therefore, the formation 
of public authority and political order is seen as an open-ended process. This is amply 
demonstrated by those authors that show how the language and practices of the state are 
appropriated by twilight institutions in their daily exercise of public authority.  They note that 
while they mimic the state in their actions and language, this does not imply that these 
practices will lead to a new, rational-bureaucratic, progressive or inclusionary political order. 
Raeymaekers (2010:546), for instance, describes an emerging relationship between rebels and 
businessmen on the Congo–Ugandan border as a protection racket. Indeed he argues that the 
rebellion did not fundamentally change the embedded practices of governance in the area; 
what occurred was the gradual redefinition of who could share in the economic spoils and 
wealth that accompanied this relationship. These studies challenge the European experience 
by showing that the centralisation of ‘coercion and capital’ may benefit few beyond those 
claiming public authority (Leander 2004:4).   
For their part, the political settlement authors’ advice to encompass a wide range of societal 
institutions as a method of ensuring cooperation between the wielders of violence raises 
serious concerns in contexts within which the prevailing political settlement rests on the 
exclusion of particular groups from access to political and economic opportunities. Perhaps 
more worryingly, the approach suggests that producing public authority and distributing 
public goods is an inherently political enterprise that creates winners and losers, leading some 
of its authors to argue that ‘conflict is ubiquitous and a normal condition in human society, 
often driving development in progressive directions’ (Di John and Putzel 2012:ii-iii). 
However, at the same time, the political settlements literature also views violent conflict as a 
temporary readjustment in the balance of power between contending elites. Indeed North et 
al. (2009) argue that elites will peacefully provide public goods and resolve disputes when 
violence is unlikely to return more rents than cooperation. Thus violence is not an inevitable 
outcome of contests over public authority. Rather it is a marker that someone or some event 
has called into question the legitimacy and credibility of the ruling coalition to the extent that 
one or more elites consider violence as a possible course of action. This is aptly demonstrated 
in a number of emerging case studies that use historical political economy to show how 
countries with similar starting positions have succeeded or failed to foster peaceful and 
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developmental political settlements (North et al. 2012). Through long-run perspectives, these 
case studies suggest that where capacity for violence is spread among multiple groups the 
factors that contribute to the stability of political settlements are likely to be contextually 
specific. Moreover, as with the case of the DRC, studies suggest political settlements can 
oscillate between being describable as inclusive, peaceful and developmental, and exclusive, 
predatory and violent (Kaiser and Wolters 2012). Further empirical and comparative work, 
much of which may include times-series analyses, is needed before the key ingredients of 
enduring and progressive political settlements can be identified.  
In sum, a close reading of the three approaches suggests that the real lesson from historical 
sociology is to understand the creation of public authority and the provision of public goods 
as ongoing and open-ended processes, and that what determines the success or failure of 
these processes for the stability and broader structure of political orders is contextually 
specific. As Jung (2008) has argued, although historical sociological accounts of state-
building may be able to tell us what went wrong in Europe, they cannot necessarily shed light 
on contemporary African contexts or elsewhere. Indeed he suggests that contemporary 
conflict-affected countries only dimly remind us of forms of rational-legal political authority 
which Weberians call a state. Rather ‘they are characterized by fragmented political 
arrangements in which international, transnational, regional, national and local interests and 
competences overlap’, and he concludes that ‘[w]hether these complex social arrangements 
will ever lead to viable states nobody knows’ (Jung 2008:40). The point here is that there is 
no necessary link between state-formation and violence. It cannot be assumed that because 
state-formation in Europe was accompanied by warfare and violence the same must be the 
case in Africa or in other non-European contexts. As our approaches suggest, even where 
contestation appears to result in inclusive, peaceful and public goods providing governance 
arrangements, there is no guarantee that governance practices will be considered legitimate 
on the ground and there are no theories about where such outcomes might lead regions in the 
long run. Analysts using historical sociological accounts of European state formation to 
predict the future of conflict-affected regions risk writing history by analogy (Mamdani 
1996). This is particularly dangerous in situations where local institutional forms and the 
patronage of the international community mask the complexity of exclusionary, predatory 
and violent underlying social processes.  
 
Blurred Boundaries 
As we have shown, the emerging approaches largely dismiss normative claims that Western 
models of statehood are the only viable modes of public authority. Public authority, therefore, 
cannot be a fixed property of the state. Rather, analysts must recognise that a whole range of 
actors, who cannot easily be identified as either private or public,  exercise public authority.  
This implies that the boundary between public/private, state/society, formal/informal is not as 
sharp as conventional theories of governance assume.  
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There are, however, different ways of explaining why these boundaries are not as well 
defined as sometimes believed. For the authors writing from the public authority from below 
perspective this is because the establishment of this boundary is in itself integral to everyday 
political struggles over public authority.  The boundary between public and private is defined 
by the political developments in different local contexts. For the HPOs literature and political 
settlement literature, however, the boundary is blurred mainly because the norms and values 
upon which authority rests in conflict-affected regions constitute a heterogeneous mix. These 
norms and values are considered valid across the conventional distinctions such as public and 
private, thus rendering them artificial. Much like the second strand of the fragile state 
discourse they recognise that public authority in conflict-affected countries is contingent 
upon values and norms arising from different origins.  Each political order is seen to be made 
up of a changing mix of interacting logics of authority, including clientelism, patrimonialism, 
and external rational-actor logics.  In a further difference from the second strand of the failed 
state discourse, they see these interactions as potentially beneficial, rather than as necessarily 
‘criminal’ depending to what extent they can produce a form of public authority capable of 
providing public goods. Yet, as we have argued above, there remains a real risk of reification 
involved in the deployment of the term ‘logic’, especially when applied to cultural norms and 
values.  
In addition to the concerns referred to above, we suggest that rather than blurring the 
boundary between different cultural forms of authority, the notion of logics may in fact 
sharpen it. Even if they do not judge ‘indigenous informal logics of authority’ as ‘inferior’ or 
‘criminal’, and even if they admit that they intertwine inside public institutions with rational-
legal Western ones, through their insistence on the existence of indigenous informal logics 
and exogenous rational-legal Western ones, the authors using this term sharpen the boundary 
separating different cultural forms of authority (Boege et al 2009:603). As Olivier de Sardan 
(2008:3) has argued, the exercise of public authority is much more ambiguous, ‘having been 
significantly altered and transformed over more than a century, and sometimes even in part 
invented’. We argue, therefore, that there is reason to be sceptical about the aggregation of 
highly dynamic and complex processes of public authority into processes of hybridisation 
between supposedly informal and formal logics. Indeed neither the formal nor the informal 
has the logical functionality and necessity ascribed to them, and neither can be assumed to 
exist prior to their invention and articulation in concrete ongoing processes of 
institutionalisation (Cummings 2013:143).  
In another reminder of the difficulty of applying these dichotomies before empirical evidence 
has been collected, Mitchell (1991) has pointed out that the definition of the boundary 
between state and society is first and foremost a political issue engaged in by interested 
actors. As such there can be no precise universal scientific definition of where this boundary 
runs. The political struggles to define this boundary and the means through which these 
struggles are carried out, are fertile ground for understanding how public authority works. He 
therefore suggests that ‘we need to examine the detailed political processes through which the 
uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is produced’ (ibid: 78).  We 
argue that this is an important insight, which the public authority from below and, although to 
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a lesser extent, the hybridity literature have embraced. Indeed by analysing these processes 
researchers may able to understand the processes through which, for instance, the distinctions 
between criminal/citizen, indigenous/foreign, soldier/civilian, public authority/rebel, and 
traditional authority/state official are produced. This would include the material resources and 
symbolic repertoires that are employed in order to administer, police, and secure the borders 
between them. The latter is particularly relevant here because it is certain to have an impact 
upon which of these categories have access to justice and security, and which among them 
are eligible to be objects of punishment and security measures for those laying claim to 
and/or exercising public authority. It will also require an understanding of the production of 
public authority from the vernacular and everyday experiences of those legitimising it and 
those subject to its exercise. 
The renewed emphasis on the importance of context-specific forms of authority has severely 
challenged the ‘fragile state discourse’. Consequently it has become harder to depict militias, 
vigilante groups, neo-patrimonial regimes and others as necessarily detracting from the 
production of public authority. As we have shown, such actors are increasingly seen as 
capable of fostering particular forms of public authority. Yet in spite of the success of the 
new approaches we echo Olivier de Sardan (2008) in arguing that there is a strong need for 
empirical research capable of capturing the complexity, variety and ambiguity of the actual 
practices of public authorities in conflict-affected regions.  There remains a noticeable lack of 
empirical data on the relationships between public authority and the provision of justice and 
security for end-users in conflict-affected areas.  
Despite this, the review has shown that there is a wide variety of ways in which public 
authority is legitimised and practiced in conflict-affected regions. Each local context is 
marked by complex relations between various public authorities and between these 
authorities and different population groups. The challenge as we see it is to take this 
complexity seriously and to forego the temptation to dismiss it as a sign of disorder. For 
policymakers, simply comparing state-based institutions that are successfully institutionalised 
with those that challenge the prevailing ideal-types of public authority will most likely 
produce a superficial objectification;  the former becomes indicative of strong public 
authority and the latter a fragile public authority. If policymakers fail to recognise the 
extraordinary complexity of specific processes of institutionalisation and ways of exercising 
public authority there is a risk that those actors who might otherwise have contributed to the 
provision of security and justice are not only overlooked but are objectified as ‘criminals’ or 
‘spoilers’. Recognising the messy relationship between political economy and processes of 
institutionalisation provides an avenue for further policy development; an avenue that we 
suggest is closer to social realities on the ground in conflict-affected countries.  
In light of the above, we recommend that donors recognise the production of public authority 
in conflict-affected countries as an indeterminate process, that can neither be assumed to end 
in the formation of strong institutions with the political will and capacity to provide public 
goods in an equitable manner, nor to degenerate into a kind of Hobbesian war of all against 
all. In this connection it should be emphasised that working through local authorities will 
hardly assure a better and more equitable provision of public goods, even though certain 
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authors within the emerging literature appear to suggest so. Those involved in daily struggles 
over public authority may not be interested in changing existing inequalities, or in extending 
the provision of justice and security to their adversaries or to those considered as ‘dangerous’ 
for their community. Instead we propose that policymakers analyse on a case-by-case basis 
the material resources and symbolic repertoires that go into the production of public 
authority. This includes uncovering the concrete practices these allow and how they may 
affect the daily security and rights of end-users. In addition we recommend that comparative 
research between case studies is pursued to identify any general patterns. 
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